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Abstract 
 
In his article “On Kant’s Reply to Hume” (1906), Arthur Lovejoy raises four interconnected 
objections to Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. In general, Lovejoy argues that (i) 
Kant fails to establish that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between 
subjective and objective perceptions of change; (ii) Kant fails to establish that the principle of 
causality is the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects; 
(iii) due to point (i) and (ii), what Kant proves in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with 
the principle of causality. Therefore, Kant commits the non-sequitur when he concludes that 
by appealing to the principle of causality, we know a priori that the same kind of antecedent 
will always be followed by the same kind of consequent; (iv) because of the non-sequitur, 
Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principles. In this thesis, I 
defend Kant from Lovejoy’s objections, in the light of which a new interpretation of the 
Second Analogy will also be provided. I argue that, in contrast to what Lovejoy claims, Kant 
successfully demonstrates in the Second Analogy that the principle of causality is not only 
the distinguishing criterion between subjective and objective perceptions of change but is 
also the distinguishing criterion between perceptions of stationary and moving objects. In 
addition, the conclusion of the Second Analogy is just a re-statement of what Kant proves, 
which can be put as a transcendental argument that suggests that the principle of causality is 
the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence (experience of objective 
successions/moving objects), which does not commit any non-sequitur. Consequently, as far 
as Kant himself is concerned, this transcendental argument is sufficient to respond to Hume’s 
skepticism concerning the principle of causality (both general and particular). 
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Impact Statement 
 
This study provides a new way of interpreting the Second Analogy. In addition, the 
conclusion of this study opens up a new way for future studies to approach the question 
concerning how Kant replies to Hume’s skepticism concerning the apriority of the principle 
of causality. 
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 6 
Introduction 
 
Despite philosophers generally agreeing that Kant is, after Plato and Aristotle, the 
most significant figure in the history of Western philosophy, they are unable to reach a 
consensus on whether such a preeminent philosopher ever makes a valid argument in the 
“Second Analogy of Experience” in the Critique of Pure Reason. Today, around 230 years 
after the first publication of the Critique, it is almost impossible to exhaustively gather and 
discuss all the criticisms of the Second Analogy, but this by no means suggests that we 
should simply put them aside. On the contrary, it appears to me that it is still worthwhile to 
examine some of the most serious and typical criticisms of the Second Analogy, and to 
consider whether the problems brought up by such criticisms have been properly addressed. 
The purpose of doing this is not just about preserving or restoring the dignity of Kant; 
instead, during the process of examining and responding to criticisms, we can expect to 
discover some previously neglected details that can contribute to a better understanding of the 
Second Analogy, which in turn will help us to deal with one of the most classical but 
unresolved problems therein, i.e. how does Kant respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning 
the principle of causality, which doubts the universality and necessity of both general and 
particular causal principles. 
The criticisms of the Second Analogy that I will consider in this thesis are those 
raised by Arthur Lovejoy in “On Kant’s Reply to Hume.” Despite the article first being 
published in 1906, and despite Lovejoy’s criticisms being particularly severe (for example, 
he calls Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy “one of the most spectacular examples of the 
non-sequitur which are to be found in the history of philosophy”1), as far as I am aware, 
                                                 
1 Arthur O. Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” in Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. Moltke S. Gram 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 303. 
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Lovejoy’s criticisms have not yet drawn enough attention or have received adequate 
responses. My aims in this thesis, therefore, are to thoroughly examine Lovejoy’s criticisms 
of the Second Analogy, provide responses to them through which a re-interpretation of the 
Second Analogy will also be made, and consider how my reading of the Second Analogy can 
be inspirational in answering the age-old question of how Kant responds to Hume’s 
skepticism. 
This thesis will be divided into five sections. The first two sections will introduce the 
background of the study by means of a detailed analysis of Lovejoy’s article. In Section One, 
I look at Lovejoy’s interpretation of the Second Analogy. In Section Two, I look at four 
interrelated objections that Lovejoy makes, based on his interpretation of the Second 
Analogy, against the validity of Kant’s argument. In general, the first objection is that, in 
contrast to what Kant claims, the principle of causality does not serve as the basis of the 
distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change. The second objection 
suggests that we also do not need the principle of causality to make the distinction between 
perceptions of stationary objects (e.g. a stationary house) and perceptions of moving objects 
(e.g. a moving ship), so Kant’s proof in the Second Analogy actually shows nothing about the 
principle of causality. Then, the third objection suggests that Kant commits the non-sequitur 
when he concludes that by appealing to the principle of causality, we know a priori that “if 
the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily 
follows,”2 which, according to Lovejoy, means that we can rely on the principle of causality 
to know a priori that a particular type of antecedent will, in all instances, be followed by the 
same type of consequent. Finally, in the fourth objection, Lovejoy claims that Kant fails offer 
a proper response to Hume’s skepticism about the principle of causality due to the non-
sequitur he commits in the Second Analogy. 
                                                 
2 Ibid., A198/B243-244, 310. 
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In Section Three, I consider a preliminary question concerning how the Second 
Analogy should be approached under the general framework of the Critique. I argue that 
Lovejoy tends to read the Second Analogy independently from the general context of the 
Critique, whereas my opinion is that the Second Analogy should be embedded in the Critique 
(in particular, in the Transcendental Analytic) and be interpreted by taking its general context 
into account. This will become the fundamental assumption under which I will interpret the 
Second Analogy and respond to Lovejoy in the following sections. 
In Section Four, I provide my responses to Lovejoy’s objections against Kant. In 
response to Lovejoy’s first objection, I argue that Lovejoy misinterprets what Kant means by 
“subjective” and “objective.” In the context of the Second Analogy, “subjective” and 
“objective” do not refer to dreaming and waking states or veridical and non-veridical 
experiences as Lovejoy claims; rather, they are indications of whether the synthesis of 
sensible/empirical representations is in accordance with rules. That is to say, “subjective” 
indicates a rule-less synthesis of sensible representations, whereas “objective” indicates a 
rule-governed synthesis of sensible representations. According to this interpretation, the 
principle of causality, as a rule of synthesis, does serve as the distinguishing criterion 
between subjective and objective perceptions of change. 
In response to the second objection, I argue that the principle of causality is also the 
basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects because as a 
pure principle of our understanding, the principle of causality determines our conceptual 
order, i.e. the principle makes the way that we conceptually synthesize the sensible 
representations determinate and irreversible. Therefore, in the case of, for instance, 
perceiving a ship sailing downstream, we have to synthesize the manifold of representations 
in a determinate way, such that the ship’s position downstream follows the ship’s position 
upstream, unlike in the case of, for instance, perceiving a stationary house where we can 
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synthesize the different parts of the house, as sensible representations in any order, as long as 
the outcome is in accordance with the concept of the house in general.  
As far as the third objection is concerned, I will show in Section Two that Lovejoy 
actually brings up two different problems when he tries to show why Kant commits the non-
sequitur. The first problem is the third objection itself, i.e. Kant commits the non-sequitur, 
and the second problem is what I will call the “subject-reality” problem, which concerns the 
gap between what we perceive or believe and how things really are. For the reason that 
Lovejoy embeds the subject-reality problem into the third objection, I will not treat it as 
independent from the third objection. Nevertheless, the subject-reality problem still requires a 
separate response, so I will divide my response to Lovejoy’s third objection into two parts 
and address the non-sequitur and the subject-reality problem in turn. 
In the first part of my response to the third objection, I argue that in the Second 
Analogy, Kant does not aim to prove the apriority of particular causal principles and does not 
conclude that we can draw necessary connections between two particular kinds of events; 
Lovejoy unfairly attributes this conclusion to Kant due to his own misunderstanding of 
Kant’s original conclusion. I will show that Lovejoy’s misunderstanding is caused by his 
misconception of the meaning of “determinate occurrence” in Kant’s conclusion and is 
misled by the presupposition he takes, which suggests that Kant aims to respond to Hume’s 
skepticism about necessary particular causal connections in the Second Analogy. I argue that 
“determinate occurrence” means an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the 
principle of causality, and Kant actually agrees with Hume that particular causal principles 
are not a priori, which means that Kant has no intention of directly responding to Hume’s 
skepticism about the apriority of particular causal principles in the Second Analogy. 
Therefore, the conclusion of the Second Analogy does not have to concern the apriority of 
particular causal principles. Following this line of interpretation, Kant’s conclusion, “if the 
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state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily 
follows,” is just a restatement of the well-established thesis of the Second Analogy: that the 
principle of causality is the necessary condition for the possibility of cognizing occurrence, 
which is not a non-sequitur. 
In the second part of my response to the third objection, which concerns the subject-
reality problem, I will first examine some of the discussions of this issue made by previous 
scholars and will argue that transcendental idealism is the key to solving this problem. By 
referring to transcendental idealism, Kant makes a distinction between objects as appearances 
and objects as things in themselves and is concerned only with objects as appearances in the 
Second Analogy. As an appearance, reality is not entirely independent of us; rather, it 
requires the rules of synthesis provided by our understanding in order to be cognizable. 
Therefore, if we take reality as reality for us in accordance with the idea of transcendental 
idealism, there will be no gap between ourselves and reality. 
Finally, regarding the fourth objection, after the discussion made in previous sections, 
it will be obvious by this point that Lovejoy’s description of Hume’s skepticism concerning 
causality is inaccurate. It will be shown in my response to the third objection that Hume 
actually doubts both general and particular principles of causality, not just the particular 
principles of causality, as Lovejoy claims. Therefore, the fourth objection should be restated 
as: Kant fails to offer a proper response to Hume’s skepticism about general and particular 
causal principles due to the non-sequitur he commits in the Second Analogy. In response to 
this objection, it will follow naturally from previous discussions that Kant does not commit 
the non-sequitur in the Second Analogy, and he actually agrees with Hume that particular 
causal principles do not express apriority. In regard to the general causal principle, Kant’s 
response to Hume is in the form of a transcendental argument, which states that the general 
principle of causality is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience. Therefore, if 
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Hume acknowledges the possibility of experience, then, as its necessary condition, Hume 
must also acknowledge the possibility of the general principle of causality. In the context of 
the Critique, as far as Kant himself is concerned, this is a proper response to Hume’s 
skepticism. 
In Section Five, I will briefly comment on the effectiveness of using transcendental 
argument as a response to Humean skepticism by considering how Hume could possibly 
argue in response to Kant, which will serve as my concluding remarks demonstrating how my 
re-interpretation of the Second Analogy in the light of Lovejoy’s criticism can be 
inspirational to answer the age-old question concerning how Kant responds to Hume. 
 
§1. Lovejoy’s Interpretation of the Second Analogy 
 
Let us start by looking at Lovejoy’s interpretation of the Second Analogy and his 
objections to Kant based on his interpretation. For this purpose, I will not offer my own 
opinions and argue against Lovejoy in this and next sections but will just describe Lovejoy’s 
argument. 
According to Lovejoy, Kant’s main concern in the Second Analogy is expressed in 
the following passage: “The apprehension of the manifold of appearances is always 
successive. The representations of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed 
in the object is a second point of reflection, which is not contained in the first.”3 That is, any 
series of distinct representations, regardless of what states of affairs they represent, always 
succeed one another, and the sequences of our perceptions of those representations are 
accordingly always successive as well, but we cannot infer from that successiveness of 
                                                 
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A189/B234, 305. 
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representations or perceptions of representations themselves whether these successions are 
simply successions in our own perceptions, or if they also represent successions in the 
represented object itself. Lovejoy considers this to be a “psychological conundrum” faced by 
Kant, which poses the underlying question, “[h]ow is it that we are able, in a series of 
apprehensions that are constantly successive, to recognize that some of these successions in 
apprehension correspond to and represent successions in the objects apprehended, and that 
others do not?”4 
Although Lovejoy does not further elaborate this “psychological conundrum,” we can 
rely on Paul Guyer’s analysis of the above-quoted passage from the Second Analogy 
(A189/B234) to get a better sense of why Kant finds that question particularly puzzling. As 
Guyer points out, the underlying premise of Kant’s argument is that “time cannot be directly 
perceived, or that, at the very least, objective temporal relations are not simply given in 
passive apprehension.”5 This corresponds to what Kant says in B233 that “time cannot be 
perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were 
empirically determined in relation to it.”6 This premise comprises three assumptions. First, 
representations indeed have a temporal order, but because the temporal order of the 
representations is always the same, i.e. successive, so we cannot rely on the temporal order of 
the representations to determine whether or not they represent objective changes. Second, it is 
obvious that individual representations, each taken and being perceived in isolation, can tell 
us nothing about the relations of what they represent over any extended time. In other words, 
“the successive states of affairs which may – or may not – be represented by successive 
representations cannot be judged to be successive on the basis of separate perceptions of 
                                                 
4 Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 294. 
5 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
244. 
6 Kant, Critique, B233, 304. 
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temporal positions of each.”7 Third, “the temporal order of the objective states of affairs 
cannot be determined by any direct access to the objects either, for it is of course only by the 
representations that the objects are given.”8 Thus, what these assumptions suggest is that 
representations themselves cannot determine the order of the states of affairs they represent, 
but we have no other access to objects other than representations. So, how can the order of 
representations be objectively determined and be distinguished from mere subjective 
successions? The determination must be grounded on something other than representations, 
but what is it? 
By following this line of interpretation, Lovejoy takes the famous contrast between 
perceptions of an unchanging house and of a moving ship, which I will refer to as the house 
and ship examples, introduced by Kant at A190-192/B235-237 as illustrations of this 
“psychological conundrum.” To summarize briefly, the house example is this: suppose that 
we see a house, and we shift our attention from the window to the rooftop. The sequence of 
our perceptions of these different parts of the house is successive, but we realize that these 
successions are only successions in our perceptions and not successions in the house itself, 
for we know that the window and the rooftop do not temporally come after one another, and 
the house does not undergo any change while we shift our attention from the window to the 
rooftop. On the other hand, the ship example illustrates a scenario where we see a ship sailing 
downstream; our perceptions are again successive in the way that our perception of the ship’s 
position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream. Unlike the situation in 
the house example, however, in this case we realize that there are successions in both our 
perceptions and the object itself. In other words, succession in our perceptions in this case 
                                                 
7 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 244. 
8 Ibid. 
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correspond to succession in the ship we perceive; there is not only succession in our 
perceptions, but also perception of successions in the object. 
Lovejoy believes that what Kant intends to demonstrate via the house and ship 
examples is that although the sequences of perceptions in both examples are successive, we 
can distinguish subjective successions in our perceptions from objectively valid successions 
in the object because of the principle of causality. In other words, the principle of causality is 
the answer to the “psychological conundrum” as it makes the order of representations 
determined. The principle of causality does not come from the representations themselves; 
rather, it is an a priori principle supplied by us, by our own understanding. This principle, 
according to Kant, suggests that “[e]verything that happens (begins to be) presupposes 
something which it follows in accordance with a rule,”9 or, as in the second edition of the 
Critique, “[a]ll alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and 
effect.”10 It “makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of 
this appearance) necessary.”11 
As far as the house and ship examples are concerned, the principle of causality is 
recognized in the ship example, but not in the house example, which makes the order of 
perceptions in the ship example determined and irreversible, thus contrasting with the 
undetermined and reversible order of perceptions in the house example. As Kant says, in the 
case of perceiving a moving ship, “if in the case of an appearance that contains a happening I 
call the preceding state of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A in 
apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B.”12 By realizing the 
irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions, which in turn is possible because of the 
principle of causality, we can distinguish objective perceptions of change from merely 
                                                 
9 Kant, Critique, A189, 304. 
10 Ibid., B232, 304. 
11 Ibid., A193/B238, 307. 
12 Ibid., A192/B237, 306. 
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subjective ones. Conversely, without the recognition of the principle of causality, “we could 
not make the distinction between the two kinds of experience, therefore all experience of the 
objective kind must conform to the rule, which is therefore certain and necessary a priori.”13 
In other words, the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the apprehension of 
something that objectively happens, which Kant calls “occurrence.”14 
In addition to determining the order of perceptions and thus helping us to make the 
distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of change, by the same principle, we 
can also know that “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence 
inevitably and necessarily follows.”15 In Lovejoy’s opinion, what Kant means to suggest here 
is, “every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be certainly known a priori 
that the same kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of 
consequent.”16 According to this interpretation, in the case where we see a ship sailing 
downstream, Kant would say that we can know a priori that the ship’s position upstream is a 
determinate antecedent of the ship’s position downstream in all instances of ship sailing; 
whenever we see a ship upstream, we can infer that it will be followed by the same 
consequent, i.e. the ship downstream. 
 
§2. Lovejoy’s Four Objections to Kant’s Argument in the Second Analogy 
 
Based on the above interpretation of the Second Analogy, Lovejoy proceeds to raise 
objections against the validity of Kant’s argument. In fact, Lovejoy does not draw clear lines 
between those objections, nor number them accordingly, but, by closely reading and re-
                                                 
13 Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 295. 
14 Kant, Critique, A192/B237, 306. I will use “occurrence” throughout the rest of the essay in place of 
“event,” which is used by Lovejoy and many others. 
15 Ibid., A198/B243-244, 310. 
16 Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 301. 
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organizing his argument, I identify four objections. As we will see in this section, these four 
objections are highly inter-connected in the way that the problem associated with the second 
objection is brought out by the first objection; the third objection is then raised because of the 
first two objections; and the fourth objection is, in turn, raised based on the third objection. 
 
2.1. The First Objection 
 
In general, the first objection suggests that, although Kant intends to show via the 
house and ship examples that the principle of causality is the criterion by means of which we 
can distinguish objective successions in the object from subjective successions in our own 
perceptions, what these two examples really demonstrate is that the principle rather serves as 
“the basis of the distinction between perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence, 
no matter whether the perceptions be ‘objective’ or purely illusory.”17 
Lovejoy starts the objection with the following statement,  
Kant is attempting, as we have seen, to rest the case for the validity of the [principle 
of causality] upon the supposed necessity of assuming that principle as the basis of 
the distinction between merely subjective, and objectively valid, perceptions of 
change, between veridical representations and “mere dream.”18 
 
Apparently, Lovejoy takes “subjective” to indicate “mere dream” or, as he later says, 
“hallucinatory representations” and “subjective play of my imagination,”19 which do not 
veridically represent changes in objects, and takes “objective” to indicate “veridical 
representations” of objects, i.e. alterations of states of objects that we perceive in a conscious 
state. 
By defining “subjective” and “objective” in this way, Lovejoy then argues that there 
is not just one, but two distinctions concerning human perceptions that need to be made in the 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 296. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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context of the Second Analogy. The first is a general distinction between “objective and 
subjective perceptions of change,”20 i.e. a distinction between perceptions of change that take 
place in reality and those take place in a mere dream. The second is “another distinction 
which runs cross-wise through both objective and subjective perceptions of change.”21 By 
“another distinction,” Lovejoy refers to the distinction between perceptions of moving 
objects and perceptions of stationary objects, that is, in the case of the Second Analogy, the 
distinction between perceptions of a moving ship and perceptions of a house. So, what the 
second distinction concerns is that, regardless of whether our perceptions are veridical or 
non-veridical, i.e. whether we are in or out of a dream, we still need to be able to make a 
distinction between perceptions of moving and of stationary objects.  
As Lovejoy says, the principle of causality is obviously not the basis of the first kind 
of distinction, for no one will concede that we can distinguish veridical experiences from 
non-veridical ones by invoking a notion of causation. On the other hand, the principle can 
serve as the basis of the second kind of distinction. Generally, we have no difficulty in 
differentiating between our perceptions of a house and of a moving ship both in and out of a 
dream, as Lovejoy points out, 
But manifestly we do make this distinction [between perceptions of moving objects 
and of stationary objects] both in our dreams and out of them, both in our most 
‘objective’ and veridical judgements of perception and in our private imaginings and 
hallucinatory representations. It is, at all events, not the common experience that in 
dreams one is incapable of picking out, within the universal successiveness of one’s 
subjective representations, those series of perceptions that are representations of 
moving objects, and those that are not.22 
 
Lovejoy believes that what Kant would suggest is that we can easily make this distinction 
between perceptions of moving and of stationary objects both in and out of our dreams 
because of the principle of causality, which makes the order of perceptions that follow one 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 297. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 296. 
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another determined and necessary. That is, by recognizing the principle of causality, the 
sequence of perceptions of moving objects is fixed and irreversible, contrasting with 
perceptions of stationary objects, where the sequence of perceptions is undetermined and 
reversible, as illustrated by the ship and house examples respectively. 
However, Lovejoy says, “[c]onsequently even if we should attach any value to Kant’s 
argument that we could not know that the ship moves while the house is stationary, without a 
knowledge of the principle of causal connection,”23 in contrast to what Kant originally has 
thought, this argument by no means shows that the principle of causality is the distinguishing 
criterion between objective and subjective perceptions of change, when “objective” and 
“subjective” are taken as indications of waking and dreaming states; instead, as mentioned 
above, “the principle really comes to figure rather as the basis of the distinction between 
perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence, no matter whether the perceptions be 
‘objective’ or purely illusory.”24 
 
2.2. The Second Objection 
 
Lovejoy does acknowledge at this point that Kant’s argument, at least, shows that the 
principle of causality serves as the basis of the distinction between perceptions of moving 
objects and perceptions of stationary objects. In his second objection to Kant, however, 
Lovejoy even denies this proposition. In Lovejoy’s opinion, the principle of causality does 
not play a role in making the distinction between perceptions of moving and stationary 
objects either. 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. Lovejoy uses “perceptions of moving objects” and “perceptions of change” interchangeably and 
uses “perceptions of stationary objects” and “perceptions of permanence” interchangeably. 
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Lovejoy contends that in demonstrating the principle of causality by using the house 
and ship examples as illustrations, Kant makes “explicit something that is contained in the 
meaning of the complex concept of a changing single object, as over against a ‘permanent 
manifold’,” but what he shows “has nothing to do with the law of causality or the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason.”25 In other words, Lovejoy believes that what the house and ship examples 
really tell us is that we can differentiate perceptions of change and perceptions of permanence 
simply by attending to the meanings of “changing single object” and “permanent manifold,” 
without appealing to the principle of causality. 
Lovejoy’s view is that in cases where we perceive or just assume that we perceive a 
“changing single object,” this “single object” or “one object” already implies the 
determinateness and irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions. This is due to the fact that 
by knowing or assuming that we are dealing with one object, our attention is fixed and 
remains constant. Although an object, such as a ship, contains different parts, and our 
attention may shift between these different parts, as long as we take these parts as a whole 
that designates a single object, our attention is fixed and remains constant in regard to this 
wholeness and oneness. Therefore, any change in perceptions cannot be the result of shifts in 
our attention, but must be the result of changes in the object itself, i.e. “whatever differences 
appear from moment to moment in the presented content must belong to the object,”26 which 
are independent of the attention of the perceiver. Consequently, the sequence of our 
perceptions must follow and correspond to the sequence of changes in the object, which 
cannot be reversed at our will. On the other hand, when we know or assume that we perceive 
a “permanent manifold,” i.e. a manifold of different stationary objects, we realize that 
changes in perceptions must be caused by shifts in our own attention when we successively 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 299-300. 
26 Ibid., 300. 
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attend to these different objects, since we know that these objects themselves do not undergo 
any change. Thus, “the order of the succession of the perceptions is conceived to be 
determined purely by the order of changes in the subject’s attention,” which can be reversed 
or put into any different order at the perceiver’s will.27 
As far as Lovejoy is concerned, “[i]n actual perception (not, of course, in mere 
sensation), so long as our attention to a given object be continuous, objects are directly given 
as moving or stationary, as altering or retaining their original sensible qualities.”28 It is true 
that all sequences of perceptions are successive, but what is required to distinguish between 
perceptions of a changing object and of a stationary object is simply that our mind has the 
ability to fix attention upon an object. In this way, according to Lovejoy, we can then 
“perceive the successive spatial relations of that chosen object of attention to other visible or 
tangible objects, and to remember and compare these perceptions from moment to 
moment.”29 In the case of perceiving a moving object, we realize that the object is moving 
because we are able to fix attention on the object and notice that it is moving in relation to 
other objects. Any change in perceptions must be caused by the moving of the object itself, 
so the order of the perceptions of that object is “determined by something ‘in the object’,”30 
and is thus irreversible. On the other hand, in the case of perceiving a stationary object, we 
realize that the object remains constant because we are able to fix attention on the object and 
notice that it is not moving in relation to other objects; if there was any inconsistency in 
perceptions, it must be because we shift our attention onto another object, and the 
corresponding order of perceptions is therefore random and reversible. 
Therefore, Lovejoy claims, we do not need the principle of causality in order to 
determine the order of perceptions and to make the distinction between perceptions of change 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 297. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 300. 
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and of permanence. What Kant simply reveals through “his illustrations of the irreversibility 
of the sequence of our perceptions of a moving ship and the indeterminateness of the 
sequence of our perceptions of the parts of a house”31 is nothing more than the obvious 
difference between the meanings of a “changing single object” and a “permanent manifold.”  
 
2.3. The Third Objection 
 
From here, Lovejoy proceeds to make the third objection. Lovejoy’s argument here is 
that the previous two objections have demonstrated that Kant’s proof in the Second Analogy 
has nothing to do with the principle of causality. What Lovejoy thinks Kant tells us via the 
house and ship examples is, 
That we cannot conceive or define any one object as changing without implying that 
the sequence of perceptions which would have been had by any subject fixedly 
attending to that object would have been determined by something “in the object,” 
and could not at the time have been had by the subject in any reverse order.32 
 
Moreover, in the case of perceiving a moving object, it shows that “those external 
phenomena are disconnected from, and independent of, that species of causal process which I 
know inwardly as intentional or purposive control of attention.”33 Lovejoy then argues that 
Kant moves, from this point about the causal independence of volition and external 
phenomena, to a conclusion about a causal connection between the external phenomena. 
Therefore, the conclusion proclaimed by Kant in the Second Analogy cannot be justified by 
what he proves, i.e. Kant commits a non-sequitur when he concludes that by relying on the 
principle of causality, we know a priori that a particular type of antecedent will in all 
instances be followed by the same type of consequent. 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 299-300. 
32 Ibid., 300. 
33 Ibid., 302. 
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The fallacy in Kant’s conclusion can also be revealed by appealing to the ship 
example. When we see the ship sailing downstream, the ship’s position upstream is indeed 
the antecedent of the ship’s position downstream, but this sequence of ship sailing applies 
only to this particular ship on this particular occasion and does not apply to all occurrences of 
the same kind. On other occasions, the ship may sail from left to right, downstream to 
upstream, or in other different directions, in which case the sequence will no longer be 
“upstream-downstream.” In other words, for the sequence “upstream-downstream” to be 
universally and necessarily valid as a particular causal principle, the ship must always sail in 
this way, and, conversely, we must be able to infer that a ship will invariably and necessarily 
be downstream at the next moment whenever we see a ship upstream. This is obviously 
inconsistent with common experience, let alone that the ship example in the Second Analogy 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the principle of causality, as shown by the first and second 
objections. 
It should be noted at this point that in the passage where Lovejoy makes a distinction 
between “I” and “those external phenomena,” he actually brings up (maybe unintentionally) 
another problem of Kant’s argument in addition to the non-sequitur, which is the problem 
that concerns the gap between what we, as the subjects, perceive or believe and how things 
really are. As we will see later, this problem has also attracted an extraordinary amount of 
scholarly attention, and it has been more thoroughly and elaborately discussed by, for 
example, P. F. Strawson and Barry Stroud.34 But since I am concerned only with Lovejoy’s 
own criticism of Kant at this point, I will leave other discussions of this “subject-reality” 
problem aside for now. 
                                                 
34 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Routledge: 
London, 1966), 133-140; Barry Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 9 
(1968): 241-256. 
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For the reasons illustrated above, Lovejoy accuses Kant of committing the following 
non-sequitur: “[b]ut all this has no relation to the law of universal and uniform causation, for 
the manifest reason that a proof of the irreversibility of the sequence of my perceptions in a 
single instance of a phenomenon is not equivalent to a proof of the necessary uniformity of 
the sequence of my perceptions in repeated instances of a given kind of phenomenon.”35 
 
2.4. The Fourth Objection 
 
Right after accusing Kant of committing the non-sequitur, Lovejoy proceeds to raise 
the fourth and final objection in the following words: “[y]et it is the latter alone that Hume 
denied and that Kant desires to establish.”36 “The latter” refers to “the necessary uniformity 
of the sequence of my perceptions in repeated instances of a given kind of phenomenon” in 
the passage I quoted in the previous section. So, what the fourth objection means is that, in 
Lovejoy’s view, Hume called into question the existence of any necessary particular causal 
principle, i.e. causal principles that necessarily and uniformly connect two particular kinds of 
occurrence, and what Kant “was called upon to prove”37 and aimed to prove in the Second 
Analogy is exactly what Hume had denied. However, due to the non-sequitur, Kant 
obviously fails to prove that particular causal principles exist, which at the same time 
indicates that Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning particular causal 
principles. 
 
§3. How the Second Analogy Should Be Approached? 
 
                                                 
35 Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 300-301. 
36 Ibid., 301. 
37 Ibid., 303. 
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Before directly engaging with Lovejoy’s interpretation of and objections to the 
Second Analogy, I will in the first instance consider a preliminary question that concerns how 
the Second Analogy should be approached. The question is that does the Second Analogy 
contain a stand-alone argument that can be appreciated without appealing to other parts of the 
Critique, or do we have to embed the Second Analogy in the context of the Critique in order 
to properly understand it? My answer to this question will become the fundamental 
assumption that I will take in my responses to Lovejoy. 
 Generally speaking, in my view, the Second Analogy should be embedded in the 
Critique (the Transcendental Analytic in particular) and be interpreted against this more 
general context. That is, we should make references to other arguments that Kant makes 
before and after the Second Analogy in order to understand the Second Analogy properly. 
However, it appears to me that this is in contrast with Lovejoy, for Lovejoy takes the 
opposite approach and believes that the Second Analogy can be detached from the Critique 
and interpreted without appealing to its context. Problems associated with Lovejoy’s 
approach will be gradually revealed in the following two sections; at present, I will just 
elaborate why I take Lovejoy as having adopted that approach, and why I prefer the opposite. 
The first reason why I think Lovejoy separates the Second Analogy from the rest of 
the Critique is simply that, throughout the article, Lovejoy never refers to any other parts of 
the Critique apart from the Second Analogy itself when he interprets and raises his objections 
to it. This becomes prominent when Lovejoy equalizes “subjective” with mere dreams and 
illusions and “objective” with veridical experiences. Lovejoy never explains why he takes 
“subjective” and “objective” in such a way; it seems that for Lovejoy, it is obvious that 
“subjective” and “objective” represent dreaming and waking states in the context of the 
Second Analogy. However, the problem is precisely that Kant neither indicates that 
“subjective” and “objective” should be understood in the way Lovejoy suggests nor gives any 
 25 
straight definition of “subjective” and “objective” in the Second Analogy. Therefore, it 
appears that Lovejoy defines “subjective” and “objective” according to their literal and 
commonsensical meanings. For when we use these terms in our daily lives or when these 
terms are used in other contexts, “subjective” can be used to indicate something that is 
subject to personal feelings and opinions, which may be illusory and distorted and cannot 
accurately reflect the objective world; on the other hand, “objective” can be used to indicate 
something that is uninfluenced by personal feelings and opinions: something veridical.  
I will show in next section that in order to accurately define “subjective” and 
“objective” in the context of the Second Analogy, we need to go back to look at the 
Transcendental Deduction, where Kant explicitly discusses problems associated with 
objectivity, and if we do so, it will become clear that Lovejoy misunderstands “subjective” 
and “objective.” It is precisely because of his misconceptions of these terms that he raises the 
first objection, which is also invalid. However, since I am concerned only with the question 
why I think Lovejoy reads the Second Analogy independently from its general context, it is 
sufficient just to notice at this point that Lovejoy does not refer to other parts of the 
Transcendental Analytic to analyze “subjective” and “objective” as they appear in the Second 
Analogy; rather, he abruptly gives his own definitions of these two important terms. 
Another evidence that reveals Lovejoy’s approach to the Second Analogy can be 
found in his aforementioned third objection to the Second Analogy, i.e. the objection that 
Kant commits the non-sequitur. In raising this objection, Lovejoy seems to exclude 
transcendental idealism as the ultimate assumption of Kant’s argument from the Second 
Analogy. By transcendental idealism, Kant means the following: 
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they 
are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, 
and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not 
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determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in 
themselves.38 
 
Or, 
We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited 
in space and time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but 
appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended 
beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in 
itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism.39 
 
As these passages suggest, by transcendental idealism, Kant draws a sharp distinction 
between objects as they appear to us or “objects of an experience possible for us” and objects 
as things in themselves. As humans with space and time as pure forms of intuition, we have 
knowledge only of objects as appearances but not of objects as things in themselves; objects 
that we cognize in experience are objects as they appear to us but not objects as things in 
themselves. Moreover, Kant thinks that our mind plays an important role in the constitutions 
of objects as appearances. That is, what we originally perceive is only a manifold of sensible 
representations, and it is only through our mind’s synthesis of the representations according 
to the concept of an object in general that objects of experience become cognizable.40 In that 
sense, objects as appearances are not purely objective and independent from the subject. 
The spirit of transcendental idealism gets expressed in the following passage in the 
Second Analogy: 
If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to 
assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the 
object. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves 
may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely 
beyond our cognitive sphere. . . . the appearances are not things in themselves, and 
nevertheless are the only thing that can be given to us for cognition, . . . .41 
 
                                                 
38 Kant, Critique, A369, 426. 
39 Ibid., A491/B519, 511. 
40 See the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction, especially A103-A110. I will return to this point 
in section 4.1. 
41 Kant, Critique, A190/B235, 306. 
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Kant makes it clear in this passage that appearances and things in themselves should be 
clearly distinguished from one another and not be confused, and, in the Second Analogy, he 
is concerned only with affairs associated with objects as appearances, since “how things in 
themselves may be is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere” and will remain unknown to us; 
the underlying assumption at work here is exactly that of transcendental idealism. 
However, in the passage that I quoted in Section 2.3, Lovejoy downplays, if not 
completely ignores, transcendental idealism. For Lovejoy treats changes in objects as 
“externally given changes” with which the subject has nothing to do, except from passively 
perceiving them; the “external phenomena” are “completely disconnected from, and 
independent of” the activities of the subject’s mind. All these phrases indicate that Lovejoy 
makes an absolute distinction between the subject and the object. For Lovejoy, objects are 
completely independent of the subject, and the subject plays no active role in the 
constitutions of objects but is merely a passive perceiver being sensibly stimulated by the 
objects. Again, since I am concerned only with the question of how Lovejoy approaches the 
Second Analogy in this section, I will not assess the validity of that approach at this point. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Lovejoy does not take transcendental idealism into account when 
he interprets the Second Analogy. 
What can be argued further from here is that given that transcendental idealism 
assumes space and time as our pure forms of intuition, which receives a full discussion in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic; and given that the success of Transcendental Deduction also 
depends on transcendental idealism, as Kant says that “[p]ure concepts of the understanding 
are therefore possible, indeed necessary a priori in relation to experience, only because our 
cognition has to do with nothing but appearances, whose possibility lies in ourselves.”42 Thus 
excluding transcendental idealism from the Second Analogy at the same time alienates the 
                                                 
42 Ibid., A130, 244. 
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Second Analogy from those preceding chapters, for in this case the argument in the Second 
Analogy is no longer working under the same assumption as those of the preceding chapters. 
The last piece of evidence that reveals Lovejoy’s approach to the Second Analogy can 
be seen in his attitudes towards how to read the Second Analogy as a response to Hume’s 
skepticism about causal principles. In the introduction of the article, Lovejoy states that 
“Kant’s only reasons” for defending the principle of causality “are to be found in the 
argument of the Second Analogy,”43 which suggests that, in Lovejoy’s opinion, the Second 
Analogy alone constitutes Kant’s answer to Hume. This presupposition then affects 
Lovejoy’s interpretation of the thesis of the Second Analogy since, as Lovejoy says, “[y]et if 
the thesis of the Second Analogy – that ‘every event follows upon an antecedent event 
according to a rule’ – is meant to have any relevancy to Hume’s problem, it should mean that 
every event has some determinate antecedent and that it can be certainly known a priori that 
the same kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of 
consequent.”44 Without drawing any textual support from the Second Analogy, the 
presupposition that the Second Analogy constitutes Kant’s answer to Hume seems to be the 
sole reason behind such an interpretation. In other words, the logic behind Lovejoy’s 
interpretation must be something like this: the Second Analogy is the only place in the 
Critique where Kant aims to answer Hume’s skepticism about causal principles, so the thesis 
of the Second Analogy must be a theory that Hume denies but Kant aims to establish, i.e. a 
proof of the universality and necessity of particular causal principles. By assigning a unique 
task to Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, Lovejoy simultaneously excludes the 
possibility that the Second Analogy needs to work together with other parts of the Critique in 
order to provide a proper response to Hume, and the possibility that the Second Analogy is 
                                                 
43 Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume,” 286. My emphasis. 
44 Ibid. 
 29 
not concerned or not just concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of 
particular causal principles. Instead, Lovejoy detaches the Second Analogy from its general 
context and argues that if the Second Analogy alone did not offer an adequate response to 
Hume, it would then be sufficient to conclude that Kant ultimately fails to respond to Hume, 
and thus that the Second Analogy contains a flawed argument. 
For the reasons illustrated above, I believe that Lovejoy, in his “On Kant’s Reply to 
Hume,” tends to treat the Second Analogy as a stand-alone piece of argument that can be 
approached without making references to other arguments in other parts of the Critique. I will 
now turn to discuss why I would like to take the opposite approach that the Second Analogy 
should be embedded in the Critique (the Transcendental Analytic in particular) and be read 
against this more general context. 
The first thing that needs to be noticed is that, as Graham Bird rightly points out, 
“Kant begins [the Second Analogy] by recalling, and presupposing, the resources he claims 
to have established in the First Analogy with respect to substance, and he goes on in the 
Second Analogy to extend the argument to [occurrences].”45 This suggests that (i) without 
what has been established in the First Analogy, we cannot proceed to consider what has been 
discussed in the Second Analogy; (ii) the argument made in the Second Analogy is an 
extension of the argument made in the First Analogy. If we can find textual support for both 
propositions, then it cannot be doubted that the Second Analogy should be read in 
conjunction the First Analogy. 
Let us start with proposition (i). In short, what has been established in the First 
Analogy, as already mentioned by Bird, is with respect to substance. As the title of the First 
Analogy suggests, Kant aims to demonstrate in the First Analogy the “[p]rinciple of the 
                                                 
45 Graham Bird, “Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” in Reading Kant, ed. Eva Schaper and Wilhelm 
Vossenkuhl (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 27. 
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persistence of substance,” which is that “[a]ll appearances contain that which persists 
(substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a 
way in which the object exists”;46 or, as Kant rephrases it in the second edition, “[i]n all 
change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished 
in nature.”47 That is, during an “alteration,” which is defined by Kant as “a way of existing 
that succeeds another way of existing of the very same object,” the substance is that which 
persists; what changes is only the state of the substance.48 A substance as such is “the 
substratum” of all appearances, and by “substratum,” Kant means the “persistent form of 
inner intuition,” i.e. time.49 This does not mean that substance is time, but substance is “the 
empirical representation” of time, and that “by which alone all time-determination is 
possible.”50 This means that since time itself cannot be perceived, it is only through a 
substance and changes in states of the substance (different appearances in relation to the 
substance) that the persistence of time itself, together with different temporal relations such 
as succession and simultaneity, can be perceived by us. Therefore, the persistence of 
substance is the condition of the possibility of understanding causality, for causality suggests 
a particular pattern of changes in states of the substance and requires succession of time as its 
schema.51 In the second edition of the Critique, Kant adds a “preliminary reminder” before 
the main discussion of the Second Analogy (B233), in which he reminds the reader of what 
alteration is, and of the fact that the substance itself does not undergo any alteration. Then, it 
is only by presupposing that which has already been established in the First Analogy, that 
                                                 
46 Kant, Critique, A182, 299. 
47 Ibid., B224, 299. 
48 Ibid., A187/B230, 303. 
49 Ibid., B225, 300. 
50 Ibid., A182-3/B226, 300. 
51 Ibid., A144/B183, 275. 
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Kant proceeds to consider why the order of some alterations is objectively determined, 
whereas others are not, as a “second point for reflection.”52 
As far as proposition (ii) is concerned, the argument that extends from the First 
Analogy to the Second Analogy is a proof of the relevant principle based on the 
characteristics of time. In the First Analogy, Kant’s proof of the persistence of substance, in 
its most succinct form, runs like this: time persists, but the persistence of time cannot be 
perceived and experienced by itself; rather, we can only experience the persistence of time in 
objects of perception. Therefore, there must be an abiding substratum that empirically 
represents the persistence of time and through which alone perceptions of changes in 
appearances are possible; such a substratum is substance. A similar line of argument can be 
found in the Second Analogy as well, where Kant argues that it is a necessary law of time 
that “the preceding time necessarily determines the following time (in that I cannot arrive at 
the following time except by passing through the preceding one).”53 However, just as in the 
case of the persistence of time discussed in the First Analogy, the succession of time cannot 
be experienced in and by itself; so we must instead encounter the successiveness of time in 
appearances. Therefore, there must be an “indispensable law of the empirical representation” 
corresponding to the temporal series by which “the appearances of the past time determine 
every existence in the following time” and cannot be reversed, which refers to the principle 
of causality.54 
Now, by taking the First and Second Analogies together and thus embedding the 
Second Analogy in the “Analogies of Experience” in general, the next question that emerges 
is what these Analogies as a whole aim to demonstrate. The short answer provided by Kant is 
                                                 
52 Ibid., A189/B234, 305. 
53 Ibid., A199/B244, 310. 
54 Ibid. This argument is identified by Kemp Smith as the “Fourth Proof” of the principle of causality 
in the Second Analogy. For Kemp Smith’s argument, see Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1918), 375. 
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that all Analogies (including the Third Analogy as well) intend to show that “[e]xperience is 
possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.”55 This 
principle brings us further back to the Transcendental Deduction, since the idea conveyed by 
this principle corresponds to the central thesis of the Transcendental Deduction, which is that, 
[A]ll experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which 
something is given, a concept of an object that is given in intuition, or appears; hence 
concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori 
conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, 
rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of 
thinking is concerned).56 
 
This suggests that pure, or a priori, concepts of understanding, i.e. categories, make the 
connection of perceptions necessary; experience is possible only through pure concepts of 
understanding. 
One may wonder at this point that if the central theses of the Transcendental 
Deduction and the Analogies are exactly the same, then why the Analogies are still needed? 
In other words, if the Transcendental Deduction has already successfully established the 
condition of the possibility of experience, then the Analogies would appear to be redundant. 
The answer to this question lies in the fact that although both the Transcendental Deduction 
and the Analogies are concerned with conditions of experiential cognitions, the 
Transcendental Deduction is on pure concepts of understanding, whereas the Analogies 
exposit what can be called as pure principles of understanding, or pure principles of 
experience, given that these principles are applied directly to empirical representations. It is 
true that both pure concepts and pure principles are conditions of experiences, and each pure 
concept corresponds to a pure principle, but the difference is that pure concepts cannot be 
applied directly to empirical representations; they must be “schematized” and become pure 
principles first before they can be employed to synthesize empirical representations. 
                                                 
55 Kant, Critique, B218, 295. 
56 Ibid., A93/B126, 224. 
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In order to explain this more clearly, let us consider the structure of the 
Transcendental Analytic. The Transcendental Analytic is divided into two books, the first 
book is the Analytic of Concepts, where the Transcendental Deduction takes place, and the 
second book is the Analytic of Principles, which contains the Analogies. In the Analytic of 
Concepts, Kant is concerned with an “analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, in 
order to research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them only in the 
understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general.”57 However, it is not 
at this place that Kant considers the use of pure concepts in experience; we will pursue pure 
concepts in the human understanding, but we need to wait “until the opportunity of 
experience” comes and then see how the pure concepts can be “finally developed and 
exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding.”58 This is a task to be finished in 
the Analytic of Principles, where Kant says: “The analytic of principles will accordingly be 
solely a canon for the power of judgement that teaches it to apply to appearances the concepts 
of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori.”59 This suggests that 
pure concepts are the conditions for pure rules or principles; pure concepts become pure 
principles when they are applied to empirical representations (as appearances). 
The Analytic of Principles is in turn divided into three chapters, and it is in the first 
chapter, “On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” that Kant answers 
the questions why pure concepts need to become pure principles when they are applied to 
empirical representations and how pure concepts can become pure principles. Kant notes that 
in order to subsume an object under a concept, the representation of the object has to be 
homogeneous with the concept. For example, we can subsume plate under the concept of 
circle because “the empirical concept of a plate has homogeneity with the pure geometrical 
                                                 
57 Ibid., A65-6/B90, 202. 
58 Ibid., A66/B91, 203. 
59 Ibid., A132/B171, 267. 
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concept of a circle, for the roundness that is thought in the former can be intuited in the 
latter.”60 However, in the case of empirical representations and pure concepts of 
understanding, the subsumption of the former under the latter and the application of the latter 
to the former are impossible because empirical representations are entirely unhomogeneous 
with pure concepts, for pure concepts are entirely a priori but we cannot encounter anything 
a priori in empirical representations. Therefore, Kant argues, we need a “third thing, which 
must stand in homogeneity with the category [pure concept] on the one hand and the 
appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter.”61 As 
a mediating representation, this third thing must have something in common with both sides, 
i.e. it must be pure on the one hand and empirical on the other.  
Kant calls such a representation the “transcendental schema” of pure concepts of 
understanding, and it is nothing but “transcendental time-determination,” for time is 
“homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and 
rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar 
as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold”;62 i.e. as discussed in 
the Transcendental Aesthetics, time is the pure form of empirical intuitions. By taking time as 
the schema of pure concepts, not only pure concepts, after being schematized, can be applied 
to empirical representations, but the use of pure concepts is also restricted; that is, the 
schematized pure concepts can only be employed in human experiences and applied to 
objects as appearances, where time and space are the pure forms of intuition. Thus, it is in the 
light of the schema, the use of pure concepts of understanding for the synthesis of empirical 
representations is authorized, and concepts become principles. It is after all these discussions 
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that Kant proceeds to the Analogies in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles, where 
the pure principles derived from the corresponding pure concepts received full elaboration. 
In the case of the Second Analogy, the pure concept behind the principle of causality 
is “Causality and Dependence,” 63 and the schema of causality is the succession of time, as 
Kant says: “The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon 
which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the 
succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule.”64 The pure concept of “Causality 
and Dependence” becomes the principle of causality when it gets schematized and applied to 
the empirical manifolds. Therefore, it is not accidental that the thesis of the Analogies 
corresponds to that of the Transcendental Deduction, since it is in the Transcendental 
Deduction that Kant first discovers the pure concept corresponds to the principle of causality 
and explains our lawful (quid juris) possession of such pure concept. 
In addition to this consistency in thesis, another evidence that reveals the integration 
of the Analogies (the Second Analogy in particular) and the Transcendental Deduction can be 
found in the Transcendental Deduction where Kant says: 
I take, e.g., the concept of cause, which signifies a particular kind of synthesis, in 
which given something A something entirely different B is posited according to a rule. 
It is not clear a priori why appearances should contain anything of this sort (one 
cannot adduce experiences for the proof, for the objective validity of this a priori 
concept must be able to be demonstrated), and it is therefore a priori doubtful whether 
such a concept is not perhaps entirely empty and finds no object anywhere among the 
appearances.65 
 
In this passage, Kant uses the concept of cause to illustrate the problem of why experiences 
must be governed by such a priori concepts of our understanding, a problem not yet solved at 
this point but to be discussed and solved in the Second Analogy by answering what Lovejoy 
calls the “psychological conundrum” mentioned in Section One. To some extent, Kant 
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already has the Second Analogy in mind when he is still at the stage of the Transcendental 
Deduction. 
There are still more passages in the Transcendental Deduction that can serve as ties to 
bind the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy together, but they cannot be 
discussed without simultaneously refuting Lovejoy’s criticisms of the Second Analogy, 
which is beyond the scope of the current section. So, I think this is a good point to conclude 
this section and move forward. Based on what has been discussed, I believe that, in contrast 
to Lovejoy, the Second Analogy should be read together with the Transcendental Deduction, 
Schematism, and the First Analogy, which, taken together, more or less constitute the entire 
Transcendental Analytic. In addition, with the principle of transcendental idealism and the 
idea that time is the pure form of our inner intuition as underlying assumptions, the Second 
Analogy should really be embedded in the Critique and interpreted by taking into account 
this general context. Ironically, however, in the process of sorting out the preliminary 
question of how to approach the Second Analogy, more problems regarding the meanings of 
certain terms and principles and concerning the problems of Lovejoy’s approach have been 
brought to light, which I will keep in mind and gradually address throughout the rest of the 
thesis. 
 
§4. Responses to Lovejoy 
 
Recall from Section Two, Lovejoy raised four inter-connected objections against the 
validity of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, which can be summarized as follows: (i) 
Kant fails to prove that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between 
subjective and objective perceptions of change. (ii) Kant fails to prove that the principle of 
causality is the basis of the distinction between perceptions of change/moving objects and of 
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permanence/stationary objects. (iii) Kant commits the non-sequitur when he concludes that 
we can know a priori that a particular type of antecedent will in all instances be followed by 
the same type of consequent. (iv) Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning 
particular causal principles. 
Despite Lovejoy’s criticisms being particularly severe, they have not yet drawn 
enough attention or have received adequate responses. To my knowledge, Henry Allison and 
Lewis White Beck have each tried to offer a response to Lovejoy. In general, Allison and 
Beck identify the non-sequitur that Lovejoy claims to find in the Second Analogy with 
another non-sequitur that Strawson claims to find in the same text.66 As a result, they believe 
that Lovejoy and Strawson can be responded to at the same time with the same response, and 
for some reason, both of them place much more emphasis on the Strawson-non-sequitur 
instead of the Lovejoy-non-sequitur, probably with the underlying thought that if we could 
adequately respond to Strawson, Lovejoy would be automatically responded to as well.  
I believe that their responses are inadequate, precisely because they conflate the two 
non-sequiturs. The non-sequitur Strawson has in mind is different from that of Lovejoy, 
since, as Van Cleve puts it, “the fallacy [Lovejoy] blames on Kant consists in supposing that 
what hold of perceptions on one occasion holds of them on all, rather than in supposing (as in 
Strawson’s fallacy) that what holds of perceptions holds of their objects.” As mentioned in 
section 2.3, Lovejoy just implicitly indicated the subject-reality problem raised by Strawson, 
but the major part of his criticism has nothing to do with the subject-reality problem. 
Therefore, a response to the Strawson-non-sequitur alone will not suffice to defend Kant 
from the Lovejoy-non-sequitur. Consequently, Allison and Beck fail to defend Kant properly 
and entirely from Lovejoy’s criticisms.67 
                                                 
66 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Routledge: 
London, 1966), 133-140. 
67 For more detailed discussions, see Henry E. Allison, “Kant’s Non-Sequitur: An Examination of the 
Lovejoy Strawson Critique of the Second Analogy,” Kant-Studien 62, no. 3 (1971): 367-377; Lewis White 
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I will now re-examine Lovejoy’s objections and try to defend Kant properly from 
them. The general strategy is to reveal the problems in Lovejoy’s arguments by focusing on 
and re-interpreting Kant’s arguments in the Second Analogy. 
 
4.1. Response to the First Objection 
 
Starting with the first objection. Recall that, for Lovejoy, Kant fails to establish the 
principle of causality as the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective 
perceptions of change, when “subjective” and “objective” are taken as indications of 
dreaming and waking states. In my opinion, this argument is problematic because it rests on a 
misunderstanding of “subjective” and “objective”; when these terms are used by Kant in the 
context of the Second Analogy, they do not refer to dreaming and waking states. 
As mentioned in Section Three, there is simply no textual support to define 
“subjective” and “objective” in the way Lovejoy suggests, for Kant neither indicates that they 
should be interpreted in that way nor clearly defines them in the Second Analogy. More 
importantly, if Lovejoy was correct, this would suggest that Kant is concerned with the 
problem of distinguishing dream and reality in the Second Analogy, which is inconsistent 
with the theme of the Analogies. The Analogies of Experience are three analogies of 
veridical experience, for Kant defines experience at the start of the Analogies as “an 
empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions.”68 
Certainly, we can claim that we also have experiences in dreams, but such experiences are by 
no means empirical cognitions, for we do not determine the objects in our dreams through 
                                                 
Beck, “Six Short Pieces on the Second Analogy of Experience,” in Essays on Hume and Kant (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978), 130-164; James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 127n15; P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(Routledge: London, 1966), 133-140. I will also come back and examine these texts later in section 4.4, where I 
address the subject-reality problem. 
68 Kant, Critique, A176/B218, 295. 
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perceptions; rather, the objects in our dreams are created by ourselves, maybe out of our 
imagination, that do not require the presence of the physical objects. Thus, by defining 
experience as an empirical cognition, Kant makes it clear that in the three Analogies, he 
concerns only with affairs in reality. 
The point that Kant concerns solely with veridical experience can also be supported 
by Kant’s use of the term “appearance” in the Second Analogy. One may have already 
noticed from the previous discussion that, as far as my discussion is concerned, the term 
“appearance” has two different meanings in the context of the Critique. On the one hand, it 
refers to objects as appearances, in contrast to objects as things in themselves, as we have 
seen in the analysis of transcendental idealism. On the other hand, it is used interchangeably 
with empirical or sensible representations/intuitions, in cases where the objects as 
appearances designated by the empirical representations have not yet been determined. For 
example, in the Schematism, Kant says: “Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, 
which must stand in homogeneity with the category [pure concept] on the one hand and the 
appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter.”69 As 
we will see later, Kant believes that the constitutions of objects as appearances require both 
empirical representations and concepts (pure and empirical). Therefore, if the appearance in 
this statement meant an object as appearance, it would indicate that the category has already 
been applied to and contained in the appearance; that is, the appearance would have been in 
homogeneity with the category already, and the third thing would no longer be needed, which 
is obviously in contrast to what Kant means to suggest. So, the appearance in the above 
statement cannot mean the object as appearance but must refer to the manifold of empirical 
representations, for at this point, the appearance is still entirely a posteriori in nature and has 
nothing in common with the category. 
                                                 
69 Ibid., A138/B177, 272. 
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In the Second Analogy, I believe that when Kant uses the term “appearance,” he 
means the empirical representation rather than the object as appearance. This is mainly 
because the Second Analogy presupposes what has been established in the First Analogy, i.e. 
substance, and continues to consider only the alterations of the states of the substance, not the 
substance itself. For example, Kant states that “I perceive that appearances succeed one 
another, i.e., that a state of things exists at one time the opposite of which existed in the 
previous state”;70 and, in what Lovejoy calls the “psychological conundrum,” “[t]he 
apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. . . . Whether they also 
succeed in the object is the second point of reflection, which is not contained in the first.”71 In 
the first statement, appearance clearly refers to the “state of things,” not the things 
themselves, and in the second statement, Kant draws a distinction between appearance and 
the object as appearance.72 
Taking appearance as empirical representation instead of object as appearance does 
not mean Kant takes non-veridical experience into account. On the contrary, as empirical 
representation, the use of the term “appearance” suggests that Kant is only concerned with 
veridical experience. The definition of empirical representation or empirical intuition can be 
found in the Transcendental Aesthetics, where Kant writes, 
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that 
through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is 
directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object 
is given to us. . . . The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the 
way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore 
given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions. . . . The effect 
of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is 
sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called 
empirical.73 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid., B233, 304. 
71 Ibid., A189/B234, 305. 
72 Recall from the Section Three that the transcendental idealism is underlying assumption of Kant’s 
argument here, so the object is object as appearance, not object as thing in itself. 
73 Kant, Critique, A19-20/B33-34, 172. 
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Thus, we need to perceive and be sensibly stimulated by a physical object in order to obtain 
empirical representations/intuitions, which will not take place in dreams. 
In addition, Kant says in the Second Analogy that appearances are “the only thing that 
can be given to us for cognition.”74 The term “given” indicates that the source of appearances 
is other than the subject. Appearances are accordingly not something that can be dreamed, 
imagined, or created by us for cognition; rather, they are given to us as empirical intuitions 
for cognition by external objects. This point gets further illustrated in the house and ship 
examples. In describing these two scenarios, Kant uses phrases such as “a house that stands 
before me,” “something happens,” “a reality,” and “be empirically perceived,”75 all of which 
indicate that Kant has two real-life scenarios in mind, in which we actually perceive a 
stationary house and a ship sailing downstream. Although what Kant argues may be 
insufficient to appease those who are particularly concerned with the distinction between 
dream and reality, as far as Kant himself is concerned, I think it is sufficient enough to 
demonstrate that Kant is not concerned with non-veridical experience in the Second Analogy. 
In my view, in the context of the Second Analogy, “subjective” and “objective” are 
indications of whether the synthesis of empirical representations is in accordance with rules. 
That is, in what Kant calls a “subjective sequence of apprehension,” there are no rules that 
determine how we should synthesize our perceptions, but in an “objective sequence of 
appearance,” the synthesis of perceptions is in accordance with rules, and the resulting 
appearance of the synthesis corresponds to an object. 
In order to fully demonstrate this, we need to return to and examine the second 
section of the A edition of the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant first considers 
problems associated with objectivity. As we will see, the concerns and arguments in this 
                                                 
74 Ibid., A190/B235, 306. Italics added. 
75 Ibid., A192/B237-238, 306-307. 
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section are later reformulated when Kant introduces the house example in the Second 
Analogy; for this reason, the house example can be used as an illustration of what Kant 
discusses in this section of the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, it is helpful if we read 
this section of the Transcendental Deduction and the relevant parts of the Second Analogy 
comparatively. 
First, consider the following two passages from the Transcendental Deduction and the 
Second Analogy respectively: 
And here then it is necessary to make understood what is meant by the expression “an 
object of representations.” We have said above that appearances themselves are 
nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regraded in themselves, in the 
same way, as objects (outside the power of representation). What does one mean, 
then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the 
cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in 
general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over 
against this cognition as corresponding to it.76 
 
Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as 
one is conscious of it, an object; only what this word is to mean in the case of 
appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but rather only 
insofar as they designate an object, requires a deeper investigation.77 
 
In both passages, Kant is concerned with the same question: what do we mean when we 
speak of an “object”? When we interact with the external world, what we originally acquire is 
a manifold of appearances in the form of sensible representations, which, as mentioned 
above, are the only things that are given to us for cognitions. Then, by being given these 
sensible representations, we speak of an “object.” Therefore, such an object must, first of all, 
correspond to these representations, for these representations are what the object refers to. 
Second, the object must at the same time be distinct from any single representation or a mere 
sum of these representations. For example, if we take a house as an object, and take the 
different parts of the house to represent sensible representations, then it is obvious that when 
                                                 
76 Ibid., A104, 231. 
77 Ibid., A189-190/B234-235, 305. 
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we speak of the house, we are referring to the door, the window, and the rooftop that we see 
in a particular place; however, the house is different from any of these single parts of the 
house, or a mere sum of these parts. Suppose we place the door, the window, and the rooftop 
next to each other, this assemblage is certainly different from the house. 
Surely, as Kant claims, we can still call everything or every representation an object, 
but only in the sense that the object corresponds to the representation, and the representation 
designates an object, not in the sense that these representations are objects themselves, since 
they are, after all, distinct from the objects they represent. Therefore, in any circumstances, 
with regard to any manifold of representations, when we speak of an object, we mean 
something in general, a “X,” that corresponds to the representations, while at the same time 
remaining distinct from them. 
Upon further reflections, Kant notices another important characteristic of the X, which 
is that once the X is posited, it instills necessity to the way we synthesize representations, as 
Kant states that, 
We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries 
something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is 
opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being 
determined a priori, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must 
also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity 
that constitutes the concept of an object.78 
 
Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, 
but the appearance that is given to me, in spite of the fact that it is nothing more than 
a sum of these representations, is considered as their object, with which my concept, 
which I draw from the representations of apprehension, is to agree.79 
 
The meanings of these two passages can be more easily understood by taking the house 
example as an illustration. When we perceive a house, we apprehend the different parts of the 
house as sensible representations successively, and the appearance that is given to us is 
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simply a sum of these representations.80 As long as we consider and recognize that these 
representations designate an object, which is a house in this case, then the way in which we 
synthesize these representations cannot be randomly determined. We cannot, for instance, put 
the rooftop under the door; instead, we must combine the different parts of the house 
according to the concept of house, so that the resulting appearance agrees with the house as 
an object. Thus, for example, in the case of seeing a regular house, in order for its appearance 
to correspond to the house as an object, we must combine the different parts of the house in a 
determined manner, such that the door and the window are embedded in the wall, the window 
is slightly above the door, and the roof is at the very top of the house, etc. In this way, the 
concept of house makes one way of combining the different parts of the house (as sensible 
representations) necessary; the appearance that corresponds to the house brought about by 
this synthesis is unique and distinct from any other random appearances, and our cognition of 
the house first becomes possible because of its concept.  
In prior discussions, it has been mentioned several times that Kant believes that our 
mind, or consciousness, plays an important role in the constitution of objects. This point also 
gets fully explained at this place by appealing to the X. Kant argues that “[e]very necessity 
has a transcendental condition as its ground”;81 and by “transcendental condition,” Kant 
means something that is prior to experience through which experience becomes possible. 
Given that the X instills necessity to the empirical representations, so the X must have a 
transcendental ground. According to Kant, this transcendental ground of the X is the 
“transcendental apperception,” which is our “pure, original, unchanging consciousness” that 
synthesizes the manifold of empirical representations into one experience in accordance with 
                                                 
80 This is not entirely accurate, for the different parts of the house are not undetermined sensible 
representations; rather, they are objects as appearances just like the house itself, which contain concepts that 
serve as rules of synthesis. Therefore, the house example at this place should be taken as a metaphor for the sake 
of clarification, which suggests us to suppose that the different parts of the house are sensible representations, 
and the house is the object of appearance that these representations represent. 
81 Kant, Critique, A106, 232. 
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rules. In other words, it is we ourselves that supply and apply the X, as a rule of synthesis, to 
the empirical representations and make experiences of objects possible. This does not mean 
that the X alone, as the pure concept of “transcendental object,”82 makes experiences 
possible. In fact, neither the empirical representations nor the X can make experiences 
possible on its own; empirical representations without the X would remain as a manifold of 
undetermined representations, but unrestricted use of the X without or beyond empirical 
representations will lead to illusion. Rather, the empirical representations and the rules of 
synthesis must work together in order to constitute objects and make objective experiences 
possible. 
Thus, when the term “object” or “objective” appears in the Transcendental Deduction 
and the Second Analogy, it indicates a necessary way of synthesis of empirical 
representations according to concepts or principles. Despite “subjective” not being explicitly 
defined, given the context, it is simply the opposite of “objective,” i.e. “our cognitions being 
determined at pleasure or arbitrarily,”83 in which case a rule of synthesis is lacking. 
Similar to the concept of house, the principle of causality, i.e. everything that happens 
presupposes something which it follows, which derives from the pure concept of “Causality 
and Dependence,” is also a rule of synthesis. When we perceive a moving object, we acquire 
a manifold of representations just like when we perceive a house, the principle of causality 
makes one way of combining these representations determined and necessary, and the 
occurrence brought about by this synthesis agrees with the moving object and is unique and 
distinct from any other random occurrences. 
The function of the principle of causality can be illustrated by the ship example. 
When we perceive a ship sailing downstream, we originally only have a manifold of discrete 
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images that each represents the ship’s position at a particular place along the ship’s path, 
from upstream to downstream, at a particular instant; it is only with the help of the principle 
of causality that we can synthesize these discrete images into a consistent whole in a 
determinate way that represents the movement of a ship from upstream to downstream as an 
occurrence. It is true that the principle of causality is not the only rule of synthesis that is 
involved in the cognition of the moving ship, since, for example, the principle of substance is 
also required in order to constitute the ship, as the object of experience, by synthesizing the 
different parts of the ship in a determinate way, nevertheless the principle of causality is no 
doubt one of the conditions of the possibility of cognizing the occurrence as such; it is 
especially required to capture the movement of the object and make our perceptions of the 
representations to be temporally determined. These will become clearer when we proceed to 
the following section. 
By taking “subjective” and “objective” as indications of the existence of rules of 
synthesis, some people might disagree with my way of reading the house and ship examples 
because, according to this new definition of “subjective” and “objective,” both examples 
become illustrations of “objective sequence of appearance,” since rules of synthesis are 
present in both cases. However, according to some commentators, the house example should 
be an illustration of “subjective sequence of apprehension,” in contrast to the ship example, 
which represents an “objective sequence of appearance,” as Kant himself also contrasts these 
examples at several instances in the Second Analogy.84 
                                                 
84 For example, see Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 365, where Kemp 
Smith states that “[w]hen we apprehend any very large object, such as a house, though we do so by successively 
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have the power of distinguishing between subjective and objective succession, i.e. between sequences which are 
determined by the order of our attentive experience and sequences which are given as such. It is this fact affords 
Kant a precise method of formulating the problem of the second Analogy, viz. how consciousness of objective 
change, as distinguished from subjective succession, is possible?” Also, see Guyer, Kant and the Claims of 
Knowledge, 244-246, where Guyer treats Kant’s argument in A190-193/B235-238 as a consistent whole, 
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It appears to me that this reading of the house and ship examples confuses “subjective 
sequence of apprehension” with subjective sequence of perceptions and confuses “objective 
sequence of appearance” with objective sequence of perceptions. In other words, according to 
this interpretation, the order of perceptions in a “subjective sequence of apprehension” is 
definitely subjective and undetermined, and conversely, the order of perceptions in an 
“objective sequence of appearance” is definitely objective and determined. However, it 
should be clear from what I have argued, in the context of the Second Analogy, the existence 
of rules of synthesis is the only criterion for distinguishing an “objective sequence of 
appearance” from a “subjective sequence of apprehension,” and the order of perceptions does 
not play a role in making this distinction; it is possible that in an “objective sequence of 
appearance,” the order of perceptions is undetermined and reversible just like our perceptions 
of a stationary house. By this interpretation, both the house and ship examples should 
represent “objective sequence of appearance,” since there are rules of synthesis involved in 
both cases. 
It is true that there are instances in the Second Analogy where Kant contrasts the two 
examples by emphasizing their difference in terms of the order of perceptions, but this does 
not go against the idea of taking both examples as representing “objective sequence of 
appearance,” since there is no contradiction in taking both examples as representing 
“objective sequence of appearance,” while at the same time representing two different kinds 
of “objective sequence of appearance.” It has been demonstrated that a rule of synthesis 
serves as the sole basis of the distinction between a “subjective sequence of apprehension” 
and an “objective sequence of appearance,” so the house and ship examples cannot be 
contrasted at this level, and Kant certainly does not contrast them at this level, since both 
                                                 
indicating that the house and ship examples correspond to “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective 
sequence of appearance” respectively. 
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contain rules of synthesis that classify them under “objective sequence of appearance.” 
Nevertheless, they can still be contrasted under the same category, since the rules of synthesis 
involved in these two examples are different, i.e. in the house example, it is the concept of a 
house, but in the ship example, it is the principle of causality. These two different rules of 
synthesis in turn determine whether our sequences of perceptions in these two cases are 
irreversible or not, which I will elaborate in more detail in next section. 
For these reasons, I believe that there is no problem in categorizing both the house 
and ship examples under “objective sequence of appearance,” in contrast to “subjective 
sequence of apprehension.” Also, since the key difference between “subjective” and 
“objective” lies in whether there are rules determining the synthesis of the empirical 
representations, and “objective” first becomes possible because of such rules, Kant’s 
argument that the principle of causality, as a rule of synthesis, is the basis of the distinction 
between “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective sequence of appearance” is 
theoretically coherent, in contrast to what Lovejoy claims. 
 
4.2. Response to the Second Objection 
 
Lovejoy’s second objection suggests that the principle of causality is not required for 
making the distinction between perceptions of permanence and perceptions of change, and 
that Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy establishes nothing about the principle of 
causality. As it has been shown in the previous section that the principle of causality serves as 
the basis of the distinction between “subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective 
sequence of appearance,” the latter half of the second objection has already been refuted. 
As far as the criticism that the principle of causality does not play a role in 
distinguishing perceptions of permanence and perceptions of change is concerned, I argue 
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that Kant could respond to Lovejoy by pointing out that the alternative theory, provided by 
Lovejoy himself regarding the distinction between perceptions of stationary and of moving 
objects, actually presupposes Kant’s theory. As a result, Lovejoy’s argument fails to be an 
objection to Kant.  
Recall from Section 2.2 that the reason Lovejoy believes we do not need the principle 
of causality to make the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving objects is 
because he argues and believes that the distinction can be drawn simply by attending to the 
meanings of “permanent manifold” and “changing single object.” 
Before considering what Kant could say in response to this argument, we first need to 
fix a problem associated with Lovejoy’s terminology. The problem is that the term 
“manifold” appears to be ambiguous. Based on what has been discussed in Section 2.2, it is 
clear that Lovejoy uses “permanent manifold” in referring to the house example; in which 
case it appears to me that there can be three different possible meanings of this term: (i) it 
means the house in the house example; (ii) it means the different parts of the house as a 
manifold of stationary objects; and (iii) it means the different parts of the house as a manifold 
of empirical representations. In my opinion, however, none of them will lead to a correct 
reading of the house example. 
When Kant uses the term “manifold” in the Second Analogy, he means a manifold of 
empirical representations that has not yet been synthesized in accordance with rules, that is, 
the object designated by the manifold of representations has not been identified by us. 
Therefore, it would be inadequate if this term was used to refer to the house in the house 
example because the house in that case is not a permanent manifold of representations; rather, 
it is a permanent object. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, what Lovejoy actually means by “permanent manifold” 
is a permanent manifold of stationary objects, which in the context of the house example is to 
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treat the different parts of the house as a manifold of stationary objects. This is correct in the 
sense that in real life, we do regard each of the different parts of the house as an object, but it 
is misleading to read the house example in this way in the Second Analogy. As discussed in 
the previous section, what the house example supposes to illustrate is that the rule-governed 
synthesis of the different parts of the house is the way through which the house becomes the 
object of experiential cognition; in which case, the different parts of the house should be 
treated as the empirical representations of the house, but not as objects. If they were regarded 
as objects, then the house example would demonstrate how a manifold of smaller objects 
compose a bigger object, which is clearly not what this example means to suggest. Besides, 
when we read the house example comparatively with the ship example, we compare the 
house as a single stationary object, with the ship as a single moving object; not the different 
parts of the house, each as a stationary object, with the ship. 
So, how about we just take “manifold” to mean the different parts of the house as a 
manifold of empirical representations, which is consistent with the text. The problem with 
this, however, is that if this was the case, then there would be no grounds to compare the 
“permanent manifold” with the “single moving object,” since on what grounds can we 
compare a manifold of undetermined empirical representations with an object?  
I think the problem is not with how to interpret “manifold,” but is instead with the use 
of the term itself. This term should either be more specific or simply avoided. The more 
accurate expression of “permanent manifold” in Lovejoy’s argument should be “permanent 
manifold of empirical representations that designates a single object,” or we can just replace 
it with “permanent single object.”  
After making this clear, let us proceed to consider how Kant could respond to 
Lovejoy’s argument. Kant could start by asking Lovejoy: “what do you mean when you 
speak of ‘object’”? And “how do objects become cognizable to us in the first place”? – which 
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are questions that Kant has asked himself in the Transcendental Deduction. As we have seen 
in the previous section, the answer to these questions that Kant himself gave is that when we 
speak of “object,” we mean something in general that corresponds to, yet is distinct from the 
empirical representations we perceive, which becomes cognizable to us when we synthesize 
the empirical representations in accordance with rules.  
Another similar question that Kant could ask Lovejoy is “how do you know that some 
objects exist simultaneously”? This question can be asked because, in Lovejoy’s opinion, 
after we fix our attention on the single object the next step is to compare this object with 
other surrounding objects in order to determine whether this object is stationary or moving, 
i.e. we know the object is moving or stationary by observing its relationship to other 
simultaneously existing objects. The cognition of simultaneity, according to Kant, is 
impossible without the principle of simultaneity, which is established in the Third Analogy, 
suggesting that “[a]ll substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, stand in thoroughgoing 
community (i.e., interaction with one another)”; or, “[a]ll substances, insofar as they can be 
perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.”85 Similar to the 
principle of causality, the principle of simultaneity is the necessary condition of the 
possibility of cognizing simultaneously existing objects.  
The next question is: will Lovejoy agree with Kant’s answers to these questions? We 
do not know since Lovejoy neither acknowledges his agreement with Kant nor offers 
different answers. However, from Kant’s point of view, he would argue that Lovejoy has to 
agree with his answers because those are the only ways that we can cognize and have 
experience of objects; the rules of synthesis are the necessary conditions of the possibility of 
objects and the experience of objects. Of course, this does not mean there really are no 
alternative answers to those questions, since Kant might be mistaken, but any alternative 
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answer would require one to adopt a theory of objectivity and experience that is different 
from that of Kant, which does not rely on the rules of synthesis to explain our ability to 
acquire objects and experiences. Then, what would concern us would be how to evaluate and 
choose between two competing theories of objectivity and experience, which is beyond the 
scope of this current discussion and is obviously not what Lovejoy does or aims to do in his 
criticism of Kant. He simply does not offer any different answers to those questions or 
introduce any alternative theories of objectivity and experience. 
Without a well-developed alternative theory of objectivity and experience at hand, 
Lovejoy is vulnerable to the claim that he has to adopt the Kantian theory of objectivity and 
experience. In addition, what makes Lovejoy even more vulnerable is that Kant could argue 
that Lovejoy actually assumes the unity of synthesis for cognizing a single object. Recall that 
Lovejoy’s argument rests on the fact that we are able to identify a single object and then fix 
our attention on this single object. In the case of the moving ship, although the ship contains 
different parts, such as the deck, the cabin, and the funnel, we can cognize it as a moving 
single object, because according to Lovejoy we are able to fix our attention on the ship as a 
whole and notice that it is moving in relation to other objects, which implies that we must 
first be able to synthesize the different parts of the ship into a single object. This unity of 
synthesis, as the necessary condition for cognizing the ship and the movement of the ship, is 
exactly what Kant wants to establish in the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, although 
Lovejoy originally aims to offer a different explanation of our cognition of the moving ship, 
he unintentionally slips back into the theoretical framework set up by Kant in the 
Transcendental Deduction. 
As a result, Kant would not disagree with Lovejoy that we can make the distinction 
between perceptions of stationary and moving objects by analyzing the meanings of 
“permanent single object” and “moving single object”; it is which part of the phrases we 
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should pay attention to that requires further investigation. In both phrases, the “object,” be it 
either a house or a ship, refers to the rule-governed synthesis of a manifold of empirical 
representations. The difference between the two phrases, rather, lies in whether the object is 
“permanent” or “moving.” The rules of synthesis required to cognize moving objects are 
different from those required to cognize stationary ones. 
This brings us back to the point that was left over from the last section, where I 
argued that both the house and ship examples represent “objective sequence of appearance,” 
but they can still be contrasted under the same category because they represent two different 
kinds of objective sequence of appearances, which involve different rules of synthesis. More 
specifically, the house example represents an objective sequence of appearance of a 
stationary object, whereas the ship example represents an objective sequence of appearance 
of a moving object. The rule of synthesis that is involved in the ship example, but not in the 
house example, is the principle of causality, which makes the cognition of the “moving” or 
the movement of the ship possible and thus distinguishes it as a different kind of experience 
from the experience of seeing the stationary house. 
The reason why the principle of causality can help us in making this distinction is 
because it introduces a kind of irreversibility. By irreversibility, I do not mean that the 
principle of causality makes the order of our perceptions irreversible like many other 
commentators have suggested; rather, I agree with Henry Allison that, 
 [I]rreversibility does not refer to a given perceptual order, which we can inspect and 
then infer that it is somehow determined by the object; it refers rather to the 
conceptual ordering of the understanding through which it determines the thought of 
an object (in this case objective succession).86  
 
That is, the principle of causality makes the way that we think an occurrence (objective 
succession) determinate and irreversible: it makes the way that we synthesize the perceptions 
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of the empirical representations determinate and irreversible. This is because the principle of 
causality, which derives from the pure concept “Causality and Dependence,” with the order 
of time as its schema, introduces the successiveness and irreversibility of time to our 
conceptual order; unlike, for instance, the principle of substance, which only considers the 
content but not the order of time when it is used to synthesize the empirical manifolds. 
Surely, those who believe that it is our perceptual order that is made irreversible by 
the principle of causality will disagree with Allison and my interpretation; but I insist that 
their reading is inadequate, and it is more contextually consistent to take irreversibility as 
referring to our conceptual order. First of all, consider the order of our perceptions in the 
house and ship examples. In both cases, our perceptual orders are irreversible, simply 
because time itself is always irreversible. It is true that in the ship example, if we see the ship 
at A at time t1 and at B at time t2, then our perceptual order must be A-B and cannot be B-A. 
However, this is equally true in the house example, in which case if we see, for instance, the 
door of the house at time t1 and the window at time t2, then as long as the observation actually 
takes place in this order, our perceptual order must be door-window and cannot be window-
door because time is irreversible, in that we cannot go back from t2 to t1 and start the 
observation all over again. In fact, this is precisely what concerns Kant in the Second 
Analogy, that we cannot know whether the successiveness pertains to the object itself simply 
by attending to the order of our perceptions of the object because our perceptual order is 
always successive and irreversible, which is in turn due to the fact that time is always 
successive and irreversible. Therefore, it would really be pointless and redundant if the 
irreversibility introduced by the principle of causality was again in respect to our perceptual 
order; we do not need the principle of causality in order to know the successiveness of our 
perceptual order, and the principle in this case would not help us in any way to solve what 
Lovejoy calls the “psychological conundrum.” Second, we should not forget that the 
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principle of causality is a pure principle of our understanding. This suggests that when it 
synthesizes the perceptions of empirical representations, it does not change or determine the 
empirical representations or our perceptions of them; rather, it is a matter of how we, as the 
subjects, think the empirical representations and our perceptions of them. 
For these reasons, I believe that the principle of causality makes the order of our 
thinking but not our perceptions of the empirical representations irreversible. By this 
understanding, what the ship example demonstrates is that, 
[I]f I judge that I am perceiving a change in the position of the ship from point A at t1 
to point B at t2, then I must also think the order of my perceptions as determined, that 
is, I must think this order as A-B rather than B-A. One can, of course, imagine a 
different order of perceptions; but doing so one is imaging a different event, for 
example, a ship sailing in the opposite direction.87 
 
Conversely, the house example demonstrates that if we judge that we are perceiving a 
stationary house from the door at t1 to the window at t2, despite the order of our perceptions 
being irreversible, we do not need to think it as determined and irreversible, that is, we can 
conceptually combine them as door-window or window-door; the order of the synthesis does 
not affect our cognition of the house as the object. 
In my opinion, this is also what Kant means when he says, “I still have to show what 
sort of combination in time pertains to the manifold in the appearance itself even though the 
representation of it in apprehension is always successive.”88 In the house example, our 
apprehension of the house is successive, but this successiveness does not pertain to the house 
itself because when we synthesize the manifolds by the concept of house, this concept does 
not introduce a determined conceptual order of synthesis; since no matter how we perceive 
the house, either from the door to the window or from the window to the door, as long as 
these different parts of the house are synthesized in the right manner (e.g. the door and the 
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window are embedded in the wall and the roof is at the very top), then the resulting 
appearance will agree with the house as an object. On the other hand, in the ship case, our 
apprehension of the moving ship is successive, and this successiveness also pertains to the 
ship itself because when we synthesize the manifolds by the principle of causality, the 
principle does introduce a determined conceptual order of synthesis; that is, the cause 
precedes the effect. Therefore, in order for the occurrence to agree with the moving object, 
the order of our perceptions becomes fixed once the principle of causality is employed during 
the synthesis. Only by attending to the nature of the rule of synthesis can we determine the 
order of perceptions and thus make the distinction between perceptions of stationary objects 
and perceptions of moving objects. 
 
4.3. Response to the Third Objection 
 
Let us now proceed to examine Lovejoy’s third objection, which contends that Kant 
commits the non-sequitur in the Second Analogy when he concludes that in the virtue of the 
principle of causality, we know a priori that a particular type of antecedent will in all 
instances be followed by the same type of consequent. Recall from Section 2.3 that Lovejoy 
reaches this conclusion in two different ways: (i) it naturally follows from the first two 
objections that Kant’s proof in the Second Analogy has nothing to do with the principle of 
causality, so any conclusion regards the apriority of the principle of causality based on that 
irrelevant proof must be invalid. (ii) Even if Kant was right, what he merely shows is that we 
need the principle of causality to connect the different states of the object, but this does not 
prove that the object itself is governed by that principle. As mentioned above, point (ii) 
actually brings up another problem, which I refer to as the subject-reality problem, that 
concerns the gap between what we perceive or believe and how things really are. Despite 
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Lovejoy embeds the subject-reality problem into the third objection, this problem still 
requires a separate response. For this reason, I will only deal with point (i) in this section and 
leave the response to point (ii) for the next section. 
Although point (i) suggests that the third objection is, in large part, based on the first 
two objections, adequate responses to the first two objections do not automatically respond to 
the third objection. This is because even if Kant has successfully established that the principle 
of causality is the basis of the distinction between subjective and objective perceptions of 
change, and is also the basis of the distinction between perceptions of stationary and moving 
objects, he would still not be able to conclude from here that we know a priori that a 
particular kind of antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of 
consequent; the fallacy of this conclusion can be easily revealed by observing occurrences in 
real life, as Lovejoy points out. Therefore, if this was Kant’s conclusion, then the non-
sequitur would persist. 
It appears to me, however, that Lovejoy unfairly attributes this conclusion to Kant due 
to his own misunderstanding of Kant’s original conclusion. In my opinion, in contrast to what 
Lovejoy suggests, Kant’s conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this 
determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows” does not mean that if the same 
kind of state that precedes is posited then the same kind of occurrence inevitably and 
necessarily follows. Rather, I argue that this conclusion suggests nothing more than the well-
established thesis of the Second Analogy, which is that the principle of causality is the 
necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence. 
In fact, Lovejoy does not explicitly explain why he interprets Kant’s conclusion in the 
way he did, but given the general context of his article I think there are at least two possible 
reasons behind that way of interpretation. First, Lovejoy takes “determinate occurrence” to 
mean “determinate kind of occurrence.” Lovejoy argues that if the thesis of the Second 
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Analogy is meant to respond to Hume, then “it should mean that every event has some 
determinate antecedent and that it can be entirely known a priori that the same kind of 
antecedent will in all instances be followed by the same kind of consequent.”89 Clearly, in 
this passage, Lovejoy equalizes “determinate antecedent” with “the same kind of antecedent.” 
Therefore, if “determinate” means “the same kind of,” then a determinate occurrence should 
mean “the same kind of occurrence,” that is, an occurrence that always takes place with the 
same kind of antecedent and the same kind of consequent. Second, we have seen that 
Lovejoy treats the Second Analogy as a piece of work dedicated to responding to Hume’s 
skepticism about necessary particular causal principles. By taking this as a presupposition, 
Lovejoy would inevitably believe that Kant’s conclusion in the Second Analogy aims to 
establish the apriority of particular causal connections between two particular types of states; 
because only then can the thesis of the Second Analogy have any relevancy to Hume’s 
problem. 
In correspondence to these two reasons, we can also examine in two different ways 
why Lovejoy’s interpretation of Kant’s conclusion is wrong. First, there is no textual 
evidence, and thus is very inconsistent with the context to take “determinate occurrence” as 
“the same kind of occurrence.” Instead, the “determinate occurrence” in Kant’s conclusion 
means an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the principle of causality. Second, 
Lovejoy’s presupposition that Kant responds to Hume’s skepticism about particular causal 
principle is misleading. In my view, Kant never aims to directly respond to Hume by proving 
that there are a priori particular causal principles. On the contrary, to some extent Kant 
actually agrees with Hume that particular causal principles are not a priori. Therefore, the 
thesis of the Second Analogy does not have to establish the apriority of particular causal 
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principles in order to have any relevancy to Hume’s problem. Let us now look at each of 
them in turn. 
According to Norman Kemp Smith, the Second Analogy contains six proofs of the 
thesis that “[e]verything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows 
in accordance with a rule” or “[a]ll alternations occur in accordance with the law of the 
connection of cause and effect.”90 Kant’s conclusion, quoted by Lovejoy (A198/B243-244), 
is the conclusion of the third proof (A196-199/B241-244) which, in Kemp Smith’s opinion, 
is a restatement of the first (A189-194/B234-239) and second proof (A194-196/B239-241).91 
I do not entirely agree with Kemp Smith’s division of the Second Analogy for I believe that 
the third proof starts at A197/B242 instead of A196/B241.92 However, I agree with him that 
the third proof is a reformulation of the arguments that Kant makes in the first and second 
proof. For this reason, we can read the conclusions of the three proofs comparatively and see 
if this could yield a better understanding of “determinate occurrence.” 
Here are the three conclusions: 
This connection [the connection of the manifold in the object] must therefore consist 
in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension 
of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in 
accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance 
itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be encountered in it, 
which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in 
exactly this sequence.93 
 
If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that 
something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. . . . Therefore I 
always make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective with respect to a 
rule in accordance with which the appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, 
are determined through the preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone 
is the experience of something that happens even possible.94 
 
Thus if I perceive that something happens, then the first thing contained in this 
representation is that something precedes, for it is just in relation to this that the 
                                                 
90 Kant, Critique, A189/B232, 304. 
91 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 371-375. 
92 I will return to this point later. 
93 Kant, Critique, A193/B238, 307. 
94 Ibid., A195/B240, 308. 
 60 
appearance acquires its temporal relation, that, namely, of existing after a preceding 
time in which it did not. But it can only acquire its determinate temporal position in 
this relation through something being presupposed in the preceding state on which it 
always follows, i.e., follows in accordance with a rule: from which it results, first, that 
I cannot reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows; 
and, second, that if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence 
inevitably and necessarily follows.95 
 
“In accordance with a rule” is the phrase that appears in all three conclusions. Given the 
context, the “rule” refers to the principle of causality, which as the third conclusion suggests 
has two functions. The first function is to determine our conceptual order, thus we “cannot 
reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows,” or, as the first 
conclusion puts it, we “cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this 
sequence”; which is what we discussed in the previous section. The problem now lies in the 
second function of the principle of causality, where Kant speaks of “determinate occurrence.” 
As the second function, it is supposed to be different from the first function. In my 
opinion, however, we should not be confused by the term “second”; that is, the so-called 
second function of the principle of causality is actually the same as the first function. The 
difference between the first and second function is that “I” is missing from the second 
function, so the second function seems to have nothing to do with the subject and are 
concerned solely with the states of the object. However, as we have seen in Section Three, 
transcendental idealism is one of the most fundamental assumptions of Kant’s argument in 
the Second Analogy, which holds that the constitutions of objects as appearances are not 
entirely independent of the subject; it is only through our mind’s synthesis of the 
representations in accordance with rules that objects as appearances become cognizable. 
Therefore, when the second function states that “if the state that precedes is posited,” it 
actually means that “if the state of the object as appearance that precedes is posited by us.” 
From this perspective, the second function is just a different expression of the first function in 
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the sense that it re-describes the function of the principle of causality from the perspective of 
the object as appearance, while the subject is hiding behind the scene. By following this line 
of thought, “determinate” should refer to the irreversibility of the conceptual order, and 
“determinate occurrence” indicates an occurrence with a determinate order of states, i.e. the 
order of what precedes and what follows is fixed and it is impossible to conceptually 
synthesize the occurrence in a different way. In other words, what Kant means to suggest is 
that when “the state that precedes is posited,” the occurrence will inevitably and necessarily 
take place in a determinate way due to the irreversibility of the conceptual order imposed by 
the principle of causality. 
We can also examine this by comparing the content of the three conclusions. In all 
three conclusions, the parts before Kant says “in accordance with a rule” carry more or less 
the same meaning, but the meanings of the parts after this phrase appear to be different. In the 
latter part of the first conclusion, Kant emphasizes the role of the subject: that it is “I” who 
“cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence,” which 
corresponds to the first function of the principle of causality in the third conclusion that “I 
cannot reverse the series and place that which happens prior to that which it follows.” On the 
other hand, the latter half of the second conclusion downplays the role of the subject; instead, 
it emphasizes the importance of the “preceding state,” through which the occurrence is 
determined, which corresponds to the second function of the principle of causality in the third 
conclusion that “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence 
inevitably and necessarily follows.” Given what Kant argues at A189-194/B234-239 and 
A194-196/B239-241, I think Kemp Smith is right that the second proof is just the first proof 
“developed in indirect fashion”96 without using any examples as illustrations. As a result, the 
conclusions of these two proofs should express the same idea as well, especially when the 
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first halves (before “in accordance with a rule”) of the two conclusions seem to have the 
same meaning. This simultaneously suggests that the two functions of the principle of 
causality in the third conclusion express the same idea, which is that the principle of causality 
determines our conceptual order and thus makes the occurrence determinate and cognizable.  
Recall that Lovejoy uses the ship example to illustrate the fallacy of the conclusion 
that he attributes to Kant, and this provides us with another way to see Lovejoy’s 
misunderstandings of both the ship example and “determinate occurrence.” The logic behind 
Lovejoy’s argument goes something like this: the ship example illustrates a determinate 
occurrence and illustrates a necessary connection between two particular states of the ship, 
i.e. the ship’s position upstream (antecedent) and the ship’s position downstream 
(consequent). Therefore, a determinate occurrence is the same as a necessary connection 
between a particular type of antecedent and a particular type of consequent; therefore, Kant’s 
conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably 
and necessarily follows” means that we can know a priori that a particular type of antecedent 
will in all instances be followed by the same type of consequent, which is fallacious. 
Lovejoy is right in saying that the ship example is a case of determinate occurrence, 
but he is wrong to read the ship example as if it depicted nothing more than a necessary 
connection between two particular states of the ship and could generalize that in all instances, 
the ship would always sail in this way. Kant tells us the purpose of using the ship example at 
A196-197/B241-242; that is, after the second proof ends and before the third proof begins: 
It is therefore important to show by an example that even in experience we never 
ascribe sequence (of an occurrence, in which something happens that previously did 
not exist) to the object, and distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our 
apprehension, except when a rule is the ground that necessitates us to observe this 
order of the perceptions rather than another, indeed that it is really this necessitation 
that first makes possible the representation of a succession in the object.97 
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This passage makes it clear that what the ship example shows is that the principle of causality 
“necessitates” our conceptual order and “first makes possible the representation of a 
succession in the object,” which is just a restatement of what we have discussed in the 
previous section. In other words, what the ship example is supposed to demonstrate is not the 
apriority of the particular causal principle “the ship upstream causes the ship downstream”; 
rather, it is an illustration of the transcendental argument that the general transcendental 
principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrences. It is true 
that the ship may sail in different directions on other occasions, but as long as we can 
synthesize the movement of the ship in accordance with the principle of causality, we can 
always perceive a “determinate occurrence” by conceptually connecting the different states of 
the ship in a determinate and irreversible order, regardless of where the ship sails. Just like in 
real life, we are able to cognize the ship sailing downstream as a determinate occurrence in 
the way that the ship upstream precedes the ship downstream. We can also cognize the ship 
sailing upstream as a determinate occurrence as well, i.e. the ship downstream precedes the 
ship upstream. 
In fact, Kant himself is aware that illustrations and examples may cause confusion, for 
he says in the A edition of the preface that he finds it “inadvisable” to swell the book with 
examples and illustrations because “[f]or the aids to clarity help in the parts but often 
confuse in the whole, since the reader cannot quickly enough attain a survey of the whole; 
and all their bright colors paint over and make unrecognizable the articulation or structure of 
the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness.”98 
Ironically, however, the ship example, as one of the very few examples and illustrations that 
Kant uses for clarification in the Critique, confuses Lovejoy “in the whole.” When we 
accurately grasp the whole, it becomes clear that the ship example, as a case of “determinate 
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occurrence,” illustrates the function of the principle of causality as the rule that necessitates 
our conceptual order and makes the cognition of the occurrence possible. In other words, a 
“determinate occurrence” is an occurrence that takes place in accordance with the principle of 
causality, and Kant’s conclusion “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate 
occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows,” suggests the function of the principle of 
causality as the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence. 
Let us now examine the second reason for Lovejoy’s interpretation of Kant’s 
conclusion. In his article “A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant,” Lewis White Beck notices 
that Hume raises two different questions concerning necessary connection: “Firstly, For what 
reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, shou’d 
also have a cause? Secondly, Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily 
have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to 
the other, and of the belief we repose in it?”99 Then Beck writes: 
I shall simplify and restate these by referring to them respectively as the question (a) 
why every event necessarily has some cause, and (b) why the same cause necessarily 
has the same effect? Still more briefly, I shall refer to the two principles Hume is 
investigating as (a) every-event-some-cause, and (b) same-cause-same-effect.100 
 
If we adopt Beck’s terminology, Lovejoy will presuppose that Kant aims to respond to 
question (b) by demonstrating the apriority of principle (b) in the Second Analogy, so the 
conclusion of the Second Analogy must be the establishment of an a priori principle (b), i.e. 
an a priori particular causal principle. 
At the moment, we should not rush to conclude that Lovejoy’s presupposition is 
misleading. Instead, let us say his presupposition is debatable, as many commentators believe 
that Kant actually never intends to respond to Hume’s skepticism about necessary particular 
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causal connections and never intends to establish the apriority of particular causal principles. 
For example, Beck argues that “[i]t has often been objected that Kant’s Second Analogy does 
nothing to support the principle same-cause-same-effect. This is true, but it was not Kant’s 
purpose there to support that principle; he was concerned only with the principle every-event-
some-cause.”101 Allison agrees with Beck that “[f]ollowing Lewis White Beck, we shall call 
the former the ‘every-event-some-cause’ principle and the latter the ‘same-cause-same-effect’ 
principle. . . . In both editions [of the Second Analogy] the goal is to establish the every-
event-some-cause principle.”102 A similar point is raised by Bird where he claims that there is 
“a natural tendency to suppose that any disagreement between Kant and Hume over ‘cause’ 
must arise over question (2), that is, over the analysis of particular causal claims,” but in fact, 
Kant only deals with question (1), i.e. the question concerning the apriority of the general 
causal principle, and not question (2).103 This interpretation is also supported by Otfried 
Höffe, as he argues that, 
Kant’s principle of causality does not assert the predictability of events but rather 
their explainability. His second analogy does not say that every event has completely 
predictable effects but that events which are to be considered objective are due neither 
to supernatural intervention nor to subjective hallucinations. They can always be 
explained as the effect of certain causes even though science in its present form may 
not yet have the required explanations. . . . In any case, Kant’s principle of causality 
provides no information as to the sort of laws in which causal connections are to be 
grasped in physics and no information as to the content of such laws.104 
 
Höffe’s opinion is that Kant’s principle of causality is a general transcendental principle that 
makes our perceptions and explanations of occurrences possible, i.e. we know that every 
occurrence necessarily has some cause and explains the occurrence as the effect of a certain 
cause only because we put the principle of causality into occurrence, and occurrence is first 
brought about through the principle of causality. However, the principle is not “a principle of 
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natural science”105 that tells us exactly what causes what. We cannot rely on the principle of 
causality to make predications of occurrences or draw necessary connections between 
different particular states of the object. 
On the other hand, Michael Friedman, for instance, supports Lovejoy’s 
presupposition, for he argues that “[w]hat does it mean for A to be the cause of B? As I 
overserved in I, Kant appears clearly to hold that there must be a law or regularity in virtue of 
which all events of the same kind as A are followed by the same kind as B.”106 Furthermore, 
“the universal causal principle must assert the existence of particular causal laws or 
uniformities as well. Moreover, if the universal causal principle asserts the existence of 
particular causal laws or uniformities, it must also assert their necessity.”107  
The problem now is to evaluate these two kinds of readings of the Second Analogy 
and see which one conforms with Kant’s original intention. It appears to me that the 
interpretation proposed by Beck, Allison, Bird, and Höffe, which holds that Kant only 
establishes the principle of causality as the transcendental condition of occurrence but does 
not intend to prove the apriority of particular causal principles, is correct; whereas Friedman 
misconceives the purpose of Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy. At the same time, this 
suggests that Lovejoy’s presupposition, which is the thesis of Friedman’s argument, is also 
misleading.  
In order to better demonstrate this point, let us examine Friedman’s argument in more 
detail. Friedman believes that Kant makes it explicitly clear in the Postulates of Empirical 
Thinking in General, which is the section right after the three Analogies, that the general 
transcendental principle of causality is the grounds of the possibility of particular principles 
of causality, as Kant states that, 
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Now there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of 
other given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in 
accordance with laws of causality. Thus it is not the existence of things (substances) 
but of their state of which alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only 
from other states, which are given in perception, in accordance with empirical laws of 
causality. . . . Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in 
accordance with dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of 
inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the 
effect).108 
 
According to Friedman, this passage tells us that “‘empirical laws of causality’ – in 
accordance with which alone any particular effect can be ‘inferred a priori’ from any 
particular cause – are very closely linked with the universal transcendental principle of 
causality (‘the dynamical law of causality’).”109 As the last sentence suggests, the possibility 
of “inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect)” is 
grounded upon the general principle of causality. 
Then, Friedman argues that it is precisely because of this kind of grounding that “even 
empirical laws too somehow count as necessary,”110 for Kant says that, 
Even laws of nature, if they are considered as principles of the empirical use of the 
understanding, at the same time carry with them an expression of necessity, thus at 
least the presumption of determination by grounds that are a priori and valid prior to 
all experience.111 
 
In addition, Friedman notices that this point is made again in the concluding remarks of the 
Analogies, that,  
There are therefore certain laws, and indeed a priori, which first make a nature 
possible; the empirical laws can only obtain and be found by means of experience, 
and indeed in accord with its original laws, in accordance with which experience itself 
first becomes possible.”112 
 
According to Friedman, both passages suggest that although particular causal principles, such 
as empirical laws, “can only obtain and be found by means of experience,” they are also the 
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necessary conditions of the possibility of experience because they are derived from the 
general transcendental principle of causality, which is their “original law.” Therefore, as 
transcendental principles, particular causal principles are “necessary and a priori in a 
derivative sense” and are not obtained solely by empirical means.113 
Friedman believes that Kant affirms this in the Second Analogy when he says: 
To be sure, it seems as if this contradicts everything that has always been said about 
the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is only through the 
perception and comparison of sequences of many occurrences on preceding 
appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain 
occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to 
form the concept of cause. On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, 
and the rule that it supplies, that everything that happens has a cause, would be just as 
contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be 
merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they would not be 
grounded a priori but only on induction. But the case is the same here as with other 
pure a priori representations (e.g., space and time) that we can extract as clear 
concepts from experience only because we have put them into experience, and 
experience is hence first brought about through them.114 
 
For Friedman, Kant explicitly states in this passage that a rule “in accordance with which 
certain occurrences always follow certain appearances,” which clearly refers to a particular 
principle of causality and has a necessity and universal validity that would not be explained if 
it was merely empirical and grounded on induction. Therefore, just like the general principle 
of causality, particular causal laws must also be a priori. 
According to Friedman’s interpretation, it becomes reasonable for Kant to conclude 
that we can reply on particular principles of causality in order to draw necessary connections 
between particular kinds of occurrences and particular kinds of preceding appearances. Even 
if this was not what Kant’s conclusion means to suggest, it would still be reasonable to assign 
this conclusion to Kant. If this was the case, then Kant would commit the non-sequitur, 
because all the proofs in the Second Analogy that we have examined so far have nothing to 
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do with particular causal laws, and, as Friedman points out, Kant never explains “[h]ow do 
the transcendental principles inject necessity into empirical laws of nature so as to secure 
them a more than merely inductive status? How do judgments that merely record observed 
regularities or uniformities become truly and ‘strictly’ universal via the addition of the 
concept of causality?”115 
However, Kant does not need to answer these questions because they are meaningless 
due to Friedman’s misinterpretation of the relationship between general and particular 
principles of causality. It is true that the general principle of causality is the ground of 
particular causal principles in the sense that the former is the form of the latter, but this kind 
of grounding by no means injects necessity and apriority into particular causal principles. 
Kant argues that, 
To be sure, empirical laws, as such, can by no means derive their origin from the pure 
understanding, just as the immeasurable manifoldness of the appearances cannot be 
adequately conceived through the pure form of sensible intuition, But all empirical 
laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under 
which and in accordance with whose norm they are first possible, and the appearances 
assume a lawful form, just as, regardless of the variety of their empirical form, all 
appearances must nevertheless always be in accord with the pure form of 
sensibility.116 
 
That is to say, time and space are the pure forms of empirical representations, so whenever 
we perceive a manifold of empirical representations, we perceive them in time and space. 
Similarly, the general principle of causality as a pure law of our understanding is the form of 
particular causal principles as empirical laws, so whenever we causally connect two 
particular kinds of occurrences, the connection assumes the general principle of causality. 
However, just as time and space do not give birth to empirical representations, so empirical 
representations cannot be derived from time and space. In the case of causality, empirical and 
in particular causal principles cannot be derived from the pure and general causal principle.  
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In other words, although the form of particular causal principles is pure, the contents 
of them are empirical; a particular causal principle is a composition of both a priori and a 
posteriori elements. Can we say, therefore, that particular causal principles are necessary and 
a priori? As far as Kant is concerned, the answer should be negative. Just like in the case of 
experience, which contains a priori elements such as the schematized pure concepts of 
understanding, and time and space as the pure forms of empirical intuitions, we will not make 
the paradoxical claim that experience is a priori, it would be awkward for us to say that 
particular causal principles are a priori simply because they contain a priori elements. 
Surely, we can say that the form of particular principles of causality is a priori, but this by no 
means suggests that particular principles of causality themselves are a priori, for this 
apriority belongs solely to their form, i.e. the general principle of causality. 
In fact, Kant agrees with Hume that empirical and particular causal laws must be 
derived from experiences. He says: 
Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, cannot be 
completely derived from the categories, although they all stand under them. 
Experience must be added in order to come to know particular laws at all; but about 
experience in general, and about what can be cognized as an object of experience, 
only those a priori laws offer instruction.117 
 
In addition, 
Now how in general anything can be altered, how it is possible that upon a state in 
one point of time an opposite one could follow in the next – of these we have a priori 
not the least concept. For this acquaintance with actual forces is required, which can 
only be given empirically, e.g., acquaintance with moving forces, or, what comes to 
the same thing, with certain successive appearances (as motions) which indicate such 
forces. But the form of such an alteration, the condition under which alone it, as the 
arising of another state can occur (whatever the content, i.e., the state, that is altered 
might be), consequently the succession of the states itself (that which has happened), 
can still be considered a priori according to the law of causality and the conditions of 
time.118 
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Here, Kant explicitly affirms that despite particular laws standing under a priori laws, 
“experience must be added” and “acquaintance with actual forces is required in order to come 
to know particular laws at all,” and of particular laws “we have a priori not the least 
concept.” The term “acquaintance” indicates Kant’s belief that particular laws can only be 
obtained by repeatedly observing and thereby becoming acquainted with “certain successive 
appearances.” This coincides with Hume’s argument that the idea of necessary connection 
can only arise from observations of constant conjunctions of two appearances. That is, if we 
constantly see that state A precedes state B, this kind of experience will give rise to a new 
internal impression in our mind; hence, the next time we see A, we will, as a kind of “habit,” 
associate B with A and think that B necessarily follows A and is caused by A.119 
Kant further reviews his agreement and disagreement with Hume in A766/B794: 
Thus if wax that was previously firm melts, I can cognize a priori that something 
must have preceded (e.g., the warmth of the sun) on which this has followed in 
accordance with a constant law, though without experience, to be sure, I could 
determinately cognize neither the cause from the effect nor the effect from the cause 
a priori and without instruction from experience. He [Hume] therefore falsely 
inferred from the contingency of our determination in accordance with the law the 
contingency of the law itself. . . . thereby, however, he made a principle of affinity, 
which has its seat in the understanding and asserts necessary connection, into a rule of 
association, which is found merely in the imitative imagination and which can present 
only contingent combinations, not objective ones at all.120 
 
Kant makes it clear in this passage that he has no intention of disagreeing with Hume, and 
that particular causal principles are not a priori. Where he disagrees with Hume is with the 
inference that Hume draws from the contingency of particular causal principles, which claims 
that the general and transcendental causal principle, as the form of particular causal 
principles, also lacks universality and necessity. 
Now, if we look back at Friedman’s interpretation, it will not be hard to discover that 
even those passages quoted by Friedman will support our current interpretation. For instance, 
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Kant says that “[n]ecessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance 
with dynamical law of causality,” and “the empirical laws can only obtain and be found by 
means of experience.”121 Although the principle that Kant has in mind at A195-196/B240-
241, i.e. the rule “in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain 
appearances,” seems to be the particular principle of causality. He says later that “the rule 
that it supplies” is that “everything that happens has a cause,” which clearly refers to the 
general principle of causality; that is, it is the general principle of causality, not the particular 
principle of causality, that has a necessity and universal validity that would not be obtained if 
it was not grounded a priori. 
To sum up, we have shown that Kant is not concerned with proving the apriority of 
what Beck calls the “same-cause-same-effect” principle. On the contrary, Kant to some 
extent agrees with Hume that particular causal laws are not a priori, and thereby do not 
express necessity and universality despite their form, i.e. the transcendental and general 
principle of causality, is a priori. This does not only suggest that Friedman misinterprets 
what Kant intends to prove in the Second Analogy, but at the same time also suggests that 
Lovejoy’s presupposition is misleading, since Lovejoy’s presupposition is exactly the same 
as the thesis of Friedman’s argument, i.e. Kant aims to establish the apriority of particular 
causal principles in the Second Analogy. Consequently, the conclusion of the Second 
Analogy does not need to establish the apriority of particular principles of causality in order 
to have any relevancy to Hume’s problem. In addition, according to our interpretation of 
“determinate occurrence,” Kant does not indicate the possibility of drawing any necessary 
connections between two particular types of occurrences. Instead, the conclusion “if the state 
that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows” 
is just a restatement of the conclusion of the transcendental argument that the principle of 
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causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of occurrence (objective sequence of 
appearances). As we have examined in 4.1 and 4.2, this conclusion is what Kant aims to 
prove in the Second Analogy; therefore, Kant does not commit any non-sequitur when his 
immediate conclusion simply affirms his proof. 
 
4.4. The Subject-Reality Problem 
 
Let us now consider the second problem brought up by Lovejoy’s argument, which is 
what I refer to as the subject-reality problem concerning the gap between our subjective 
perceptions and beliefs and objective reality. Although Lovejoy thinks of this problem simply 
as another demonstration of the non-sequitur that he claims Kant commits to in the Second 
Analogy, the subject-reality problem attracts the attention of many later scholars, and 
gradually becomes an independent objection to the Second Analogy and transcendental 
argument in general. 
Two of the most representative reformulations of the subject-reality problem are made 
by P.F. Strawson and Barry Stroud. In his analysis of the Second Analogy, Strawson also 
claims that from the point where Kant demonstrates the principle of causality as the 
necessary condition of perceiving the ship sailing downstream as an occurrence, “the 
argument proceeds by a non sequitur of numbing grossness.”122 This is because Kant 
abruptly jumps from his proof that the order of our perceptions of two states A and B is 
determinate and necessary, to the conclusion that “the transition or change from A to B as 
itself necessary.”123 According to Strawson, this is in turn because Kant conflates two 
different senses of “necessity,” i.e. “conceptual necessity” and “causal necessity,” and 
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“play[s] on the notion of necessity to confuse us.”124 That is to say, what Kant shows is that it 
is conceptually necessary that we connect our perceptions of different states of the object in a 
determinate way, but this does not mean that the different states of the object themselves are 
causally and necessarily governed by a rule. 
Stroud’s argument is slightly different from that of Strawson. Stroud starts by 
considering the problem of using transcendental argument as a response to Humean skeptics. 
We have already used the phrase “transcendental argument” several times in previous 
sections but have not clearly defined it. As Stroud points out, despite Kant using the term 
“transcendental,” he never uses the phrase “transcendental argument” and never regards his 
argument as a “transcendental argument.” This phrase was invented and used by later 
scholars125 to refer to a particular kind of argument that bears the form “X is the necessary 
condition of the possibility of Y.” That is, a transcendental argument claims that “one thing 
(X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of something else (Y), so that (it is said) the 
latter cannot be obtained without the former.”126 
According to Paul Franks, this kind of argument has an “internal relation”127 to 
skepticism because the question concerning the possibility of something X that a 
transcendental argument tends to solve is usually brought up by skeptics. That is, skeptics 
doubt the possibility of X, whereas transcendental philosophers want to refute them by 
demonstrating that X is in fact possible. So, the question that transcendental philosophers 
should consider is “how is X possible?” In answering this question, transcendental 
philosophers start with something else, Y, which is something that even skeptics will not or 
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cannot doubt its possibility. Then, by developing a valid transcendental argument, which 
shows that X is the necessary condition of Y, i.e. the possibility of Y cannot be obtained 
without the possibility of X, at the same time it shows that X must be possible, and the 
skeptics cannot deny the possibility of X while acknowledging the possibility of Y. 
In the case of the Second Analogy, the transcendental argument that Kant makes is 
that “the principle of causality is the necessary condition of occurrence (experience of 
objective successions).” The X in this case is the principle of causality, and Y is occurrence. 
Since Hume (or the skeptics that Kant has in mind when he writes the Second Analogy) does 
not deny the possibility of occurrence, then, according to the logic of transcendental 
argument, they cannot deny the possibility of the principle of causality, given that occurrence 
is impossible without the principle of causality as its necessary condition. As Eckart Förster 
puts it, the transcendental argument that Kant makes does not, strictly speaking, demonstrate 
“the falsity of the sceptic’s position”; rather, it shows “the pointlessness, or idleness” of 
skepticism in the sense that a skeptic like Hume will inevitably make a paradoxical claim 
when he acknowledges occurrence on the one hand, while denying the necessary condition 
for the possibility of thinking or speaking of occurrence.128 
However, Stroud argues that in any transcendental argument, “for any candidate S,” 
“the skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make language possible if we 
believe that S is true, or if it looks for all the world as if it is, but that S needn’t actually be 
true.”129 That is, in the case of the Second Analogy, the skeptics can insist that we need to 
believe the possibility and truth of the principle of causality in order to make sense of 
occurrence, but the principle of causality itself need not actually be true, for it is just a pure 
principle of our understanding that may not reflect the truth of the objective world that is 
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independent of us. As Ralph C. S. Walker puts it, “there seems to be a difference between 
establishing that everyone must believe [the principle of causality] to be true and justified, 
and establishing that [the principle of causality] actually is true and justified. This applies 
whether [the principle of causality] itself makes a claim about the world independent of us, or 
only a claim about what we must believe or think.”130 
Although this criticism is slightly different from that of Strawson, for Strawson’s 
criticism concerns the gap between our perceptions and reality, Stroud’s criticism concerns 
the gap between our beliefs and reality; they do belong to the same camp in the sense that 
both criticisms concern the gap between the subject and the objective world. Based on what 
we have discussed above, they are apparently valid criticisms of the Second Analogy, for 
what Kant demonstrates in the Second Analogy is that the principle of causality is our rule of 
synthesis of the representations and it is the rule of our understanding that determines our 
conceptual order, which seems to have nothing to do with the objective reality. 
Before proceeding to offer my response to this subject-reality problem, let us first 
consider some responses from previous scholars. Robert Stern argues that the subject-reality 
problem does not impede Kant’s transcendental argument in the Second Analogy from 
having anti-skeptical value: 
[F]or, I hold, they can still be employed against a form of scepticism which questions 
whether our beliefs are even rational or justified, where this sceptic accepts that he 
cannot establish the latter claim merely by showing that they could be false, or are 
based on belief-forming methods that could be unreliable. I will therefore suggest that 
to refute this second form of skepticism, we do not need the ambitious kind of 
transcendental argument that has proved so problematic, and that a more modest 
approach can suffice, where the conclusion to be established is merely used to help us 
justify the belief in question, by showing that we are entitled to hold it, even if we 
could be mistaken in so doing.131 
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In a nutshell, Stern believes that the supposed targets of Kant’s transcendental argument in 
the Second Analogy are not the “epistemic skeptics” who claim that “we fail to know 
anything (global scepticism), or to have some sort of knowledge in past (local scepticism), 
where knowledge is held to require certainty.”132 Instead, the skeptics that Kant intends to 
respond to in the Second Analogy are the “justificatory skeptics” “who merely asks to be 
shown that in believing p, we can give grounds that by our own lights we are entitled to 
appeal to in this context, in accordance with our doxastic norms, to make the belief 
reasonable (if not certain).”133 In this case, Stern argues, the transcendental argument in the 
Second Analogy does not have to take the ambitious form and be “truth-directed,” i.e. to 
establish the truth and certainty of the principle of causality in order to respond to the 
epistemic skeptics; rather, it can take a more modest form and be “belief-directed,” that is, we 
can simply accept that there is a gap between the subject and reality, and “simply accept that 
the only conclusion we are entitled to draw from the Second Analogy is that we must merely 
believe that A caused B, if we are to apply any sort of temporal determination to these states, 
and thus to treat A–B as an event at all.”134 
In Stern’s opinion, this modest and belief-directed transcendental argument is 
sufficient on its own to respond to the justificatory skepticism, as long as it shows that our 
belief of the principle of causality conforms to any one of our “deepest logical and 
intellectual standards and procedures.” Then, Stern argues that one of our “deepest logical 
and intellectual standards and procedures” that we can appeal to in this case is “coherence,” 
that is, “if S’s belief-set is more coherent with the belief that p as a member than without it or 
with any alternative, then this belief is justified for S.”135 To test whether a belief p belongs to 
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a person’s belief-set, and makes that belief-set more coherent is what Stern calls “the test of 
coherence,” and, 
[O]n this account, the aim of the Second Analogy would be to produce an argument to 
show that our belief in causal determination has a justification, insofar as that belief is 
required, in order for us to take a sequence of representations – to be evidence for 
the event A–B, and not some other event B–A, or no event at all, and thus to include 
such propositions within our belief-system.136 
 
 
As far as Stern is concerned, once the principle of causality passes “the test of coherence,” 
the belief-directed transcendental argument in the Second Analogy can be used as a response 
to justificatory skepticism. 
However, Stern’s solution to the subject-reality problem is shown to be problematic 
by Mark Sacks. First of all, Sacks argues that things like “the test of coherence,” “belief-set,” 
and “deepest logical and intellectual standards and procedures” are ambiguous, for “in every 
case of genuinely mistaken (minimally considered) belief there precisely are grounds that the 
believers can give which by their own light they are entitled to appeal to in this context to 
make the belief reasonable (if not certain).”137 In other words, beliefs and “logical and 
intellectual standards and procedures” are highly subjective; everyone has their own belief-
system that may contain quite different beliefs. Consequently, for every belief, regardless of 
how awkward or mistaken it may be, as long as the person genuinely believes it, he or she 
can always find internal justification for their mistaken belief and can make it internally 
coherent with their belief-system. Equally, the person can claim that his or her belief-set is 
more coherent with the mistaken belief as a member of the belief-set. 
 Sacks argues that this kind of personal and mistaken beliefs makes justificatory 
skepticism pointless. For instance, suppose that a man sincerely believes that being 
photographed will take away his soul, it would appear to be pointless and, to some extent, 
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even ridiculous to raise a serious skeptical objection against that belief. On the other hand, 
the man can respond to a justificatory skeptical challenge of his belief simply by claiming 
that he runs a “test of coherence” and finds out that his belief-set (maybe a set of beliefs 
instilled by a religion) is more coherent with this belief as a member than without it. 
Therefore, if, according to Stern’s definition, justificatory skeptics merely ask to be shown 
that we can give justifications that by our own lights we are entitled to believe something p, 
then, in Sack’s opinion, justificatory skepticism and the responses to it can hardly form 
serious philosophical discussions. As Sacks says: “As its stands, then, the strictly perspectival 
notion of internal justification at work seems too weak for a form of scepticism based on it to 
have any bite, or–what comes to the same thing–for the abundance of easy answers to such 
‘sceptical challenges’ to carry any real anti-sceptical weight.”138 This suggests that it is 
unlikely that the skepticism that Kant intends to respond to in the Second Analogy is 
justificatory skepticism, and it is also very unlikely that Kant’s argument in the Second 
Analogy is just an internal justification of our belief in the principle of causality, in the same 
sense as the man finds an internal justification for his belief in “photographing taking away 
one’s soul.” 
In addition, Sacks argues, based on what Kant says in the Second Analogy, we can 
make the stronger claim that Kant does not merely provide an internal justification for our 
belief in the principle of causality, and Stern’s interpretation cannot be an adequate 
reconstruction of what Kant should have said. Sacks insists that although the principle of 
causality is a pure principle of our understanding, it does interact with and apply to the 
external world, i.e. we employ the principle of causality to synthesize empirical 
representations, which are entirely external to us and a posteriori. We do not merely believe 
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the principle of causality as a necessary condition of occurrence, but we actually experience 
the principle of causality as a necessary condition of occurrence.139 
Another response to the subject-reality problem is provided by Ralph C. S. Walker. 
According to Walker, the subject-reality problem can be avoided if we reconstruct Kant’s 
transcendental argument in a “second-personal” way. Walker believes that we often take 
transcendental arguments in what he calls a “third-personal” way, that is, we often detach 
transcendental arguments from their contexts. In this way, we treat transcendental arguments 
just as arguments with a particular kind of form (“P; but Q is a necessary condition of P; so 
Q”140), but like all other arguments, we think transcendental arguments try to establish 
something, some objective facts that can be approached without attending to the contexts by 
which such arguments are first made. 
Walker argues that this way of approaching transcendental arguments is improper; 
rather, we should understand them in a “second-personal” way. “To take an argument 
second-personally is to place it in the context of trying to convince an interlocutor of 
something,” and “the advantage of taking Kant’s [transcendental arguments] second-
personally is that it enables us to see why the premisses should take the form they do and 
why the arguments should be effective.”141 This suggests that we should treat transcendental 
arguments primarily as responses to skeptics in the context of philosophical discussions. We 
can imagine there are skeptics and transcendental philosophers who are talking to and 
arguing with each other. In Walker’s opinion, this will help us understanding why 
                                                 
139 Ibid., 75-77. Although Sacks does not point this out, I believe that his point can be supported by the 
following passage from the Second Analogy: “But the case is the same here as with other pure a priori 
representations (e.g., space and time) that we can extract as clear concepts from experience only because we 
have put them into experience, and experience is hence first brought about through them. Of course the logical 
clarity of this representation of a rule determining the series of occurrences, as that of a concept of cause, is only 
possible if we have made use of it in experience, but a consideration of it, as the condition of the synthetic unity 
of the appearances in time, was nevertheless the ground of experience itself, and therefore preceded it a priori.” 
See, Kant, Critique, A196/B241, 308-309. 
140 Ralph C. S. Walker, “Induction and Transcendental Argument,” in Transcendental Arguments: 
Problems and Prospects, ed. Robert Stern (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 20. 
141 Ibid. 
 81 
transcendental arguments start with premisses such as there is experience or some kind of 
knowledge such as the law of non-contradiction. This is because, from a second-personal 
stance, in order for skeptics to engage with and form proper philosophical conversations with 
anyone who accepts those premisses, they have to acknowledge the truth of those premisses 
as well, otherwise they are just boring people whose points are uninteresting and cannot be 
argued with. Suppose that someone denies the law of non-contradiction and is always happy 
to contradict oneself, how can such a person be argued with or refuted? 
Of course, as Walker says, the point that the skeptics who deny those premisses 
cannot be argued with does not immediately prove that, 
[The skeptics] might not be thinking or applying concepts in some other way, 
following different rules governed by a different logic. Nor does it follow that laws 
like the law of non-contradiction must match the way the world is. All that follows is 
that we must take it for granted that they do, to the extent of relying firmly on the 
assumption that they do, and being unable to enter into debate with anyone who does 
not reply on that assumption.142 
 
In addition, 
Of course very few people never contradict themselves. It is not the occasional 
contradiction that puts someone beyond the reach of argument. To say that people 
rely on the law of non-contradiction is not to say they always stick to it, but that they 
try to, and that when they fail–if they detect the failure–they recognize the need to put 
things right. Such principles must serve as norms, which people must recognize as 
guiding their thought. It is the people who do not give them this normative role who 
are beyond the reach of argument, and whose position is uninteresting; if indeed there 
are any such people.143 
 
The argument still holds if we replace “the law of non-contradiction” in these passages with 
“the principle of causality.” That is, according to Walker’s interpretation, if we understand 
Kant’s transcendental argument in the Second Analogy second-personally, it will become 
clear that what Kant emphasizes is that the skeptics cannot deny the normative role of the 
principle of causality without rendering their arguments pointless. In this way, the subject-
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reality problem would no longer bother us because despite the principle of causality may not 
match the way the world is, it still cannot be denied. 
Graham Bird, however, finds Walker’s solution to the subject-reality problem 
unsatisfactory. Bird points out that “[o]ne puzzle about the third-second person distinction 
arises from the fact that the same formal argument is involved in both cases,”144 as both third-
personal and second-personal transcendental arguments start with the same premisses and 
proceed in the same way (“P; but Q is a necessary condition of P; so Q”). The only difference 
between these two types of transcendental argument is that “if we leave it as a third-person 
argument the sceptic can just refuse to play the game of argument at all, and then he becomes 
invulnerable. The second-person account, however, adds to the basic argument the point that 
by refusing to accept the premisses the sceptic buys that invulnerability.”145 In other words, 
in Bird’s view, the real difference between the third- and second-personal transcendental 
argument is not that the second-personal argument invites the skeptics into the discussion, but 
it is that the second-personal argument “adds a further comment on the status of the 
premisses namely that they cannot be denied without rendering the argument pointless.”146 
So, regardless of whether the skeptics play the game of argument, the second-personal 
argument will make their arguments uninteresting and pointless if they deny the premisses. 
According to Bird, the problem with reconstructing Kant’s transcendental argument 
second-personally is that because the form of the second-personal argument is still the same 
with the third-personal argument, this reconstruction avoids the subject-reality problem 
instead of solving it. It is possible for the skeptics to acknowledge the premisses while 
denying that those premisses reflect reality; as Walker himself also points out that principles 
such as the law of non-contradiction may not match the way the world is. Therefore, the 
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impossibility of denying the premisses does not fundamentally eliminate the subject-reality 
problem. Consequently, “although it is clear that [Walker] thinks such arguments succeed 
against the sceptic because there is no serious alternative to what the sceptic doubts, it is not 
clear whether it succeeds to the extent of showing that the beliefs (or practices) which the 
sceptic doubts are true (or truth-yielding).”147 
There may be other responses to the subject-reality problem, but it is not our task here 
to exhaustively search and discuss them. I feel that the responses and counter-responses 
provided by Stern, Sacks, Walker, and Bird are sufficient to demonstrate the extent to which 
the subject-reality problem attracts scholarly attention. I will now turn to offering my own 
response to the subject-reality problem. In general, I believe that the subject-reality problem 
can be solved by appealing to the idea of transcendental idealism. 
As Sacks points out, the transcendental argument Kant makes in the Second Analogy 
concludes with “the vindication of beliefs about the external world,”148 for the principle of 
causality is not only the pure principle of our understanding that determines our conceptual 
order, but it can also be applied to the external world, i.e. the manifold of empirical 
representations, and synthesize the empirical representations in a determined way. This, 
Sacks argues, has already presupposed that we successfully bridge the subject-reality gap.149 
The reason behind such presupposition, or the reason that validates such 
presupposition, in my opinion, is the idea of transcendental idealism. As we have discussed in 
Section Three, by transcendental idealism Kant draws a distinction between objects as 
appearances, and objects as things in themselves. Things in themselves are unknowable to us, 
and Kant is only concerned with objects as appearances in the Second Analogy. He says that, 
If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be able to 
assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is combined in the 
object. For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves 
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may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely 
beyond our cognitive sphere.150 
 
As appearances, the constitutions of the objects are not entirely independent of us. That is, 
what we originally perceive is only a manifold of empirical representations, and it is only 
through our mind’s synthesis of the representations in accordance with the concept of an 
object in general that objects as appearances become cognizable, as we have seen in 
Transcendental Deduction.  
What this indicates is that for Kant, there is actually no gap between subject and 
reality if we take reality as the external world composed by objects as appearances, because 
in this case, reality is not independent of us. In a sense, we can say that we make reality 
possible by supplying rules of synthesis: reality is the reality for us. On the other hand, if we 
take reality as the external world that is composed by things in themselves and is entirely 
independent of us, Kant would suggest that reality in this sense is unknowable to us and is 
beyond the concern of the Second Analogy and the Transcendental Analytic in general. In 
other words, if reality represents a world of things in themselves, there may be a gap between 
subject and reality, but such a gap does not pose a problem since what concerns us is the 
reality for us, i.e. a world of objects as appearances. 
The problem that Lovejoy, Strawson, and Stroud have, therefore, is that they raise 
their criticisms from a “realistic” point of view, according to which “A and B and the 
substance of which they are states are ontologically real, independent of any construction; 
they are not mere phenomena ‘under a law given them by understanding,’”151 which does not 
take transcendental idealism into account. If we bear transcendental idealism in mind and 
deal only with objects as appearances, the subject-reality problem no longer threatens the 
validity of Kant’s argument. This certainly does not mean we have to embrace transcendental 
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idealism and the Kantian view of reality; rather, what this suggests is that in the context of 
Transcendental Analytic, “transcendental idealism has emerged as seemingly the only way of 
safeguarding a form of [inference to reality]” and “Kant’s central transcendental arguments, 
if they are to deliver what they promise, do seem to require underpinning by transcendental 
idealism.”152 
 
4.5. Response to the Fourth Objection 
 
Finally, Lovejoy’s fourth objection to the Second Analogy contends that due to the 
non-sequitur, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism concerning particular causal 
principles. Now, based on what has been discussed above, it should become clear at this point 
that Lovejoy wrongly describes Hume’s skepticism about the principle of causality, for 
Lovejoy only mentions Hume’s skepticism about particular causal principles, but not the 
general causal principle. As was made clear in Section 4.3, Hume actually doubts the 
universality and necessity of both general and particular causal principles. Therefore, for the 
fourth objection to even make sense, it should be rephrased as follows: due to the non-
sequitur, Kant fails to respond to Hume’s skepticism about general and particular principles 
of causality. 
After all the previous discussions, the problem of this objection should also become 
obvious at this point. First of all, Kant does not commit the non-sequitur in the Second 
Analogy. As regards to his response to Hume, Kant actually agrees with Hume that particular 
and empirical causal laws can only be known a posteriori, and thus do not express 
universality and necessity. Where Kant disagrees with Hume is with regard to the general and 
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transcendental causal principle, which Hume claims to be a posteriori as well, whereas Kant 
believes it to be a priori.  
The formal response to Hume regarding the general principle of causality is the 
central transcendental argument of the Second Analogy, which claims that the (general) 
principle of causality is the condition of the possibility of occurrence. This suggests that 
given that (as Kant believes) Hume acknowledges the possibility of empirical causal 
principles and occurrence, as their necessary condition he must also acknowledge the 
possibility and apriority of the general principle of causality. As far as Kant himself is 
concerned, this is a proper and sufficient response to Hume’s skepticism. 
 
§5. Concluding Remarks: The Fourth Objection and Beyond 
 
So far, we have responded to Lovejoy’s four objections against the validity of Kant’s 
argument in the Second Analogy, through which the Second Analogy itself has also been re-
interpreted. According to this new interpretation, what Kant demonstrates in the Second 
Analogy is that the principle of causality, like other rules of synthesis, is the basis of the 
distinction between the “subjective sequence of apprehension” and the “objective sequence of 
appearance.” Then, within the “objective sequence of appearance,” the principle of causality 
further helps us to distinguish between perceptions of stationary objects and perceptions of 
moving objects (occurrences) by determining our conceptual order. In other words, the 
principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility for our cognitions of 
occurrences. This argument can be directed as a response to Hume’s skepticism about the 
principle of causality in the way that as long as Hume acknowledges occurrence, he must also 
acknowledge its necessary condition, i.e. the principle of causality. 
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However, as mentioned in the previous section, the effectiveness of using 
transcendental argument as a response to Hume is conditional, in the sense that within the 
context of the Critique, transcendental argument is sufficient to respond to Humean 
skepticism. Whether transcendental argument is truly effective in responding to Humean 
skepticism remains debatable. Due to space limitations, in this final section, I will only 
briefly make some comments on this question by considering one possible way by which 
Hume could respond to Kant, which I hope will be helpful for future research on this topic. 
Recall from Section 4.4 that Stroud argues that “the skeptic can always very plausibly 
insist that it is enough to make language possible if we believe that S is true, or if it looks for 
all the world as if it is, but that S needn’t actually be true.”153 I think that this argument 
suggests two possible ways by which a skeptic like Hume can challenge a transcendental 
argument. First, the skeptic could argue that even if the subject believes S is true, there may 
still be a gap between belief and reality; this is the subject-reality problem that we have 
discussed and resolved in Section 4.4. Second, the skeptic could deny the transcendental 
argument by simply refusing to accept the truth of S. This means that in the case of the 
Second Analogy, the S in the transcendental argument is “occurrence.” It may be true that 
Hume does not deny occurrence, but his conception of occurrence may be very different from 
that of Kant. That suggests that although Hume does not deny “Humean occurrence,” he may 
still deny “Kantian occurrence,” thus refusing to even accept S, which will make him 
impervious to the transcendental argument that Kant makes in the Second Analogy. 
Consequently, in order to answer Hume, Kant probably needs another transcendental 
argument that shows that Humean occurrence is impossible without presupposing Kantian 
occurrence as a necessary condition. This, in my opinion, is a possible direction to expand 
upon what I have argued in this thesis. 
                                                 
153 Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” 255. 
 88 
Finally, to sum up, all of Lovejoy’s criticisms of the Second Analogy are invalid due 
to Lovejoy’s misunderstanding of the original text. In the Second Analogy, Kant successfully 
demonstrates that the principle of causality is the basis of the distinction between (i) 
“subjective sequence of apprehension” and “objective sequence of appearance”; and (ii) 
perceptions of stationary objects and moving objects and concludes with the transcendental 
argument that the principle of causality is the necessary condition of the possibility of 
occurrence, which does not commit any non-sequitur. In regard to Hume’s skepticism, Kant 
agrees with Hume that particular principles of causality are not a priori, whereas he disagrees 
with Hume that the general principle of causality is not a priori either. As a necessary 
condition of the possibility of occurrence, Kant believes that Hume should not doubt the 
apriority of the general principle of causality if Hume does not doubt the possibility of 
occurrence.  
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